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ANTI-GANG ORDINANCE IS STRUCK DOWN
31 States Urged High Court to Uphold Chicago Loitering Law
The San Diego Union-Tribune
Friday, June 11, 1999
Aaron Epstein
WASHINGTON - Rejecting pleas
from officials in all levels of government,
the Supreme Court struck down a
sweeping Chicago anti-gang law aimed at
breaking up sidewalk gatherings that
intimidate residents in crime-infested
neighborhoods.
By a 6-3 vote yesterday, the justices
ruled unconstitutional an ordinance that
allowed a police officer to order loiterers
to disperse or be arrested if they stood or
sat around in one place "with no apparent
purpose" in the presence of a suspected
gang member.
Although the 1992 ordinance was
unique to Chicago - where it had been
used to arrest 43,000 people over a three-
year period - public officials elsewhere
had hoped it would survive constitutional
scrutiny so they could press for similar
laws in their communities.
Chicago public officials, filing a joint
legal brief, had hailed the ordinance as a
method of "breaking the gangs'
stranglehold on the streets and destroying
their aura of invincibility."
In all, 31 states - including California
- and various organizations of cities,
counties, mayors, district attorneys and
police chiefs, all facing gang problems of
their own, supported the Chicago
ordinance in the Supreme Court. So did
the Clinton administration, which has
awarded $11 million to help cities develop
anti-gang strategies.
But Justice John Paul Stevens
concluded for the majority that the
Chicago law was so vaguely worded that it
gave police officers too much discretion
and converted "a substantial amount of
innocent conduct" into crimes punishable
by a maximum $500 fine and six months
in jail.
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The ordinance allowed the police to
order people to move on without
inquiring into their reasons for remaining
in one place, Stevens said.
"It matters not whether the reason
that a gang member and his father, for
example, might loiter near Wrigley Field is
to rob an unsuspecting fan or just to get a
glimpse of Sammy Sosa leaving the
ballpark," wrote Stevens, the court's most
liberal member, a native of Chicago and a
former student, lawyer and appellate judge
there.
"Friends, relatives, teachers,
counselors, or even total strangers might
unwittingly engage in forbidden loitering
if they happen to engage in idle
conversation with a gang member."
In fact, Cook County Public Defender
Rita Fry said, the ordinance enabled the
Chicago police to arrest thousands of
innocent people, mostly African
Americans and Latinos, leaving them with
"a record that can make it more difficult
to seek employment, to obtain credit or to
access certain benefits."
"Worst of all, the enforcement policy.
enhanced the sense of hostility and
mistrust between police and young men of
color," Fry said.
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley said the
city will draft a new ordinance. Ohio
State Solicitor Edward B. "Ned" Foley,
who helped write a friend-of-court brief,
pointed out that the opinion "laid out a
blueprint" that would allow a different
version of the law to be found
constitutional.
"They want loitering laws to be more
defined, and that's a whole different
ballgame than saying they shouldn't exist,"
Foley said.
The court said a better definition for
the term "loiter" might be lingering in one
spot "with no apparent purpose other
than to establish control over identifiable
areas, to intimidate others from entering
those areas, or to conceal illegal activities."
The city of Chicago defined loitering
as "remaining in any one place with no
apparent purpose."
Justice Antonin Scalia, who taught at
the University of Chicago Law School,
delivered a stinging rebuttal from the
bench, calling the court decision "a
regrettable incursion on the people's right
to govern themselves."
Unless some constitutional right, such
as freedom of speech or religion, is
involved, it is up to the citizens to decide
for themselves whether they are willing to
exchange some personal liberty for
community safety, Scalia said.
"I would gladly trade my ability to
hang out with a gang member in exchange
for the liberation of my neighborhood in
an instant," Scalia said.
The three dissenters were the court's
most conservative members: Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Clarence Thomas
and Scalia.
None of the justices disputed the
gravity of the rapid growth of youth gangs
and gang-related crimes.
In 1975, according to government
estimates, there were 55,000 gang
members in the United States. In 1996,
the U.S. Justice Department estimated
there were more than 665,000 gang
members and counted 31,000 street gangs,
in all 50 states.
In Chicago, where the 125 street gangs
include the notorious Gangster Disciples,
Vice Lords and Latin Kings, the City
Council enacted the anti- loitering
ordinance in an effort to deter drug
dealing, drive-by shootings, turf wars,
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vandalism and intimidation of law-abiding
citizens.
Officials described the law as an
outgrowth of what has become known as
the "broken windows" thesis: the idea that
neighborhoods can be saved by cracking
down on such signs of visible disorder as
panhandling, public drinking, graffiti,
vandalism, prostitution, rowdyism,
littering and loitering.
Thomas chided the court majority for
focusing on "the 'rights' of gang members
and their companions," rather than "good,
decent people" like 88-year- old Susan
Mary Jackson, who told the City Council:
"We used to have a nice neighborhood.
We don't have it anymore. . . . I am scared
to go out in the daytime . . . you can't pass
because they are standing. . . ."
The Chicago anti-loitering ordinance
was enforced for about three years before
Illinois courts declared it unconstitutional
in 1995. During that period, Chicago
police officials said, gang-related
shootings and homicides declined
dramatically.
Copyright C 1999 The San Diego Union-
Tribune
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In Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct.
1849, the Supreme Court ruled that a
Chicago law designed to get gangs off the
streets was unconstitutionally vague. The
June 10 result occasioned an emotional
dissent from Justice Clarence Thomas,
who suggested that "any fool would
know" that the ordinance was not vague.
Justice Antonin Scalia also dissented,
but his opinion was more, well, Broadway.
It burst into show tunes to mock the
"lively imagination" of the six fools in the
majority. Not every term do Leonard
Bernstein and Stephen Sondheim find
their work cited by the high court for the
proposition, "Gee, Officer Krupke, krup
you.
Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra
Day O'Connor must have made a
deliberate decision not to go there,
because an obvious response to Scalia--
and Thomas, whose dissent was joined by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist-- comes
from the same show. "I like to be in
America," O'Connor might have sung.
"Everything free in America." Swing the
spotlight to Stevens, who adds, "For a
small fee in America."
Because freedom in America is not
always free. That's the not-so-subtle
subtext of the Morales decision. Indeed,
sometimes freedom turns out to be more
expensive for the poor. But in Morales,
the Supreme Court says that it's still a
required purchase--no returns, no
exchanges.
In response to citizen complaints
about gangbangers intimidating law-
abiding citizens on city streets, the
Chicago city council had enacted the
Gang Congregation Ordinance in 1992.
The law authorized the police to order
people to disperse when they were
"loitering" in a public place with anyone
an officer "reasonably believes to be a
criminal street gang member."
Loitering was defined as remaining in
a place "with no apparent purpose." Any
person who refused a police request to
move from a public place was subject to
six-months imprisonment and a $500 fine.
During the three years that the law was
enforced, more than 42, 000 Chicagoans
were arrested. Most of them were African-
American or Hispanic.
The anti-gang law was controversial
from the beginning, in large part because
several provisions seemed to depend too
much on the judgment of individual
police officers. When does an officer have
a "reasonable" belief that someone is a
gang member? How far did one have to
move when so ordered by an officer?
Down the block or out of the
neighborhood? What does it mean to
remain in a public place "with no apparent
purpose"?
In anticipation of these concerns, the
Chicago police department established
guidelines that it claimed prevented the
ordinance from being enforced in an
arbitrary or discriminatory way. The
primary group of officers who made
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arrests under the statute were members of
a squad who had received special training
in recognizing gang members. Police
commanders were supposed to designate
the city neighborhoods that suffered from
gang problems, and the law was supposed
to be enforced only within those areas.
The identity of these neighborhoods was
kept secret from the public.
The law was challenged (like the
famous exhortation about when to vote in
Chicago) early and often. In individual
cases it seldom survived. Eleven trial
judges ruled it unconstitutional; only two
found it constitutional. Ultimately, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the law
violated due process because it was too
vague.
The state of Illinois, supported by the
Justice Department and 31 of its sister
states, appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Amicus briefs defending the law
were also filed by citizens groups in
Chicago, including those purporting to
represent the interests of poor and
minority communities in having safer
streets.
Justice Stevens announced the
judgment of the Court (although three of
his concurring colleagues opined
separately as well). The majority agreed
with Illinois' highest court that the anti-
gang ordinance violated due process
because it was too vague.
A criminal law can be
unconstitutionally vague for two reasons.
First, a statute might not give adequate
notice as to what one has to do to comply,
so that citizens might find themselves
locked up without realizing that they had
broken any law. Second, a statute might
allow for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.
According to Justice Stevens, the
Chicago law failed both these tests. To
make this point, Stevens, like Scalia, cited
popular culture--but not any highfalutin
musical theater. A Chicago native, Stevens
knows how to market his opinions, even
the potentially unpopular ones, to his
audience. Thus, to prove just how much
power the law gave police, he wrote: "It
matters not whether the reason that a
gang member and his father, for example,
might loiter near Wrigley Field is to rob an
unsuspecting fan or just to get a glimpse
of Sammy Sosa leaving the ballpark; in
either event, if their purpose is not
apparent to a nearby police office, she
may--indeed, she shall'-- order them to
disperse."
Da Cubs! Nice play, Your Honor.
Stevens' strongest argument, however,
was that the law made virtually anyone a
potential criminal: "Friends, relatives,
teachers, counselors, or even total
strangers might unwittingly engage in
forbidden loitering if they happen to
engage in idle conversation with a gang
member."
Stevens noted that the police
department's internal guidelines could not
truly limit discretion because they were
not actually provisions of the law. For
example, a person arrested in a part of the
city not designated in the guidelines could
not then use the guidelines as a legal
defense.
If Only ...
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Stephen Breyer, reluctantly concurred in
the holding that the law was too vague.
But she was careful to emphasize the
"narrow scope" of the decision and to
note that "there remain open to Chicago
reasonable alternatives to combat the very
real threat posed by gang intimidation and
violence."
Indeed, O'Connor offered a short
tutorial to the city on how it might draft a
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constitutional anti-gang statute: "If the
ordinance applied only to persons
reasonably believed to be gang members,
this requirement might have cured the
ordinance's vagueness because it would
have directed the manner in which the
order was issued by specifying to whom
the order could be issued."
If only the law had been limited to
gangbangers, and not anyone who
happened to be in a gangbanger's
company. If only loitering meant
remaining in one place with the intent to
intimidate others from entering that area
or to conceal illegal activities. The only
problem with Justice O'Connor's if- only's
is that most of the conduct she describes
is already illegal in Chicago. The statute
was valuable, and unconstitutional,
precisely because it penalized people for
totally innocent behavior.
The three dissenting justices did not
understand all the fuss about vagueness.
Thomas was especially grumpy: "There is
nothing 'vague' about an order to
disperse," especially after one has been
loitering, which has been "disfavored
throughout American history."
Scalia agreed, invoking the characters
of "West Side Story" to show how gang
members who willfully disobey police
orders to disperse would know "they had
it coming." As for non-gang members?
Well, opined Scalia, the "minor limitation
upon the free state of nature . . . imposed
upon all Chicagoans seemed to them (and
it seems to me) a small price to pay for
liberation of their streets."
Scalia repeated that point in
announcing his opinion from the bench:
"I would trade my right to loiter in the
vicinity of a gang member in return for
the liberation of my neighborhood in an
instant." For better or worse, however,
neither the justice nor the residents of
Chicago get to make that choice. The
Constitution already has made it, in favor
of the loiterers.
The not-so-small fee paid by residents
of crime-infested neighborhoods is that
they still have to live with gangbangers, at
least until those gangbangers commit
some crime for which they may
constitutionally be arrested. However, we
have a consolation prize for the
beleaguered law-abiding citizens: their
own liberty.
Morales is one of those unfortunate
cases that posits scared senior citizens and
little kids trying to walk to school on one
side, and gangbangers and their best
friends at the American Civil Liberties
Union on the other. To read even the
dour majority opinions is to be left with
the impression that the forces of evil-
cum-liberty won. Past are the upbeat '60s-
era decisions, like Papachristou v.
Jacksonville (1972), in which the Supreme
Court said that loitering and loafing are
"historically part of the amenities of life as
we have known them."
Past also are the simpler issues in
those cases, which often represented last-
ditch efforts by the South to hang on to
white supremacist law enforcement. That
is not the case in Chicago. Many African-
American and Hispanic citizens actually
supported the law, and many minority
cops actually enforced it.
The fact is that residents of high crime
areas usually know exactly who the bad
guys are. The Chicago statute forced many
of those guys to crawl into a hole. In
theory, that's an eminently good idea, and
you don't have to be a conservative
Supreme Court justice to recognize it.
The traditional liberal rejoinder is:
Today the police arrest the bad guys;
tomorrow the police arrest you. I don't
think that risk is underestimated, including
by many supporters of the law. Poor
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blacks and Hispanics are the last people
who need to be warned against
overzealous law enforcement.
Rather, Scalia is right. There are a lot
of citizens who would gladly obey a police
officer's order to move along--even when
they're doing nothing wrong-- in exchange
for a feeling of security when they leave
their homes. In Morales, the Court
essentially ruled that people are entitled to
due process - indeed, they have to pay for
due process - whether they want it or not.
In reality, however, there is no need
for regret, even for enthusiasts of law and
order. The Chicago law was not
particularly intelligent or effective. In the
first place, as Stevens pointed out, if a
gang member were standing in public with
some illegal intent, like selling drugs or
protecting his turf, he would not be
subject to arrest under the statute because
he would have an "apparent purpose."
More important, there is compelling
evidence that the law did not succeed
even on its own terms. It is true, as
Thomas noted, that during the years the
law was enforced, there was a substantial
reduction in the homicide rate, and that
the first year after the law was struck
down, the homicide rate rose.
But in 1997, two years after the
ordinance was declared invalid, gang
homicides dropped, by 19 percent.
Effective crime control requires more
than just arresting tens of thousands of
people.
So, despite Justice O'Connor's broad
hint, Chicago should not simply rewrite
the anti-gang ordinance and have another
go at Court review. It uight make for an
interesting lesson in constitutional law,
but it would not much improve the lives
of the poor. Chicago has a much more
important responsibility to its low-income
citizens--building a community in which
bartering constitutional rights for safe
streets will not seem as reasonable as it
does today.
Paul Butler is an associate professor at
George Washington University Law
School. His column "The Home Front"
appears monthly in Legal Times.








Supreme Court of the United States
Decided Dec. 8, 1998
DEFENSE BAR HAILS RULING
New Jersey Lawyer
Monday, December 14, 1998
Scott Goldstein
New Jersey defense lawyers see it as a
no-brainer, but they're still rejoicing that
the U.S. Supreme Court departed from its
hardline law-and-order approach by
unanimously ruling police in most
instances cannot search a vehicle or its
occupants following a routine traffic stop.
"Finally, one for the defense," said
Atlantic City attorney Edwin J. Jacobs Jr.
about last week's decision. "The last
couple of decades haven't been so good
for the defense, but this one was quite
obvious."
The Iowa case has been closely
watched because the high court in recent
years has rolled off a spate of search-and-
seizure rulings tilting toward law
enforcement.
Police in various parts of the nation
have been hoping the justices would
sanction Iowa's law allowing searches as
part of routine traffic stops. Had the
court given that statute the green light, it
probably would have jump-started
initiatives for such measures in much of
the nation. "I think it's a terrific decision
for civil liberties and the right of privacy
because what the court has done is
created boundaries of where police cannot
go in terms of privacy," said Weehawken
lawyer Joseph A. Hayden Jr.
"Obviously, the court is sending a
message that protecting officers can only
go so far as invading the privacy of
motorists."
For years, the New Jersey and U.S.
high courts have taken different roads on
key search-and-seizure issues with the
state court generally leaning more toward
individual rights.
"I know automatically a judge in New
Jersey is not going to let stand a search of
a vehicle after a traffic violation if there is
nothing suspicious," noted New
Brunswick defense attorney Steven D.
Altman.
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He said he considers it obvious for
the nation's high court to rule against a
law that "permits cops to stop me or you
for going 46 in a 35 and search the car."
But Chatham attorney Alan L. Zegas
said even police in New Jersey have used
motor vehicle stops to execute illegal
searches and "this is one of the few cases
in the past decade where the (federal)
court has refused to go along with the
common police practice."
Before a search, said Zegas, president
of the Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers of New Jersey, police "will
usually ask and usually the driver will give
consent, but there are many instances
where a car has been searched on the sole
suspicion of a police officer who stopped
a car for a traffic violation and the
suspicion is not enough to justify the level
of intrusion that occurs."
In its Knowles v. Iowa ruling, the
justices said the state law there violates
the Fourth Amendment.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted
the court in the past has allowed searches
after a suspect's arrest because of a
concern for officer safety and because of
the need to discover and preserve
evidence. These two conditions do not
apply to traffic citations, he wrote.
"While concern for officer safety ...
may justify the 'minimal' additional
intrusion of ordering a driver and
passengers out of a car, it does not by
itself justify the often considerably greater
intrusions attending a full ... search,"
Rehnquist said.
He noted officers have other ways to
search for weapons and protect
themselves from danger, including
ordering motorists out of the car.
In this case, a driver in Iowa was
arrested for drug possession after his car
was searched without consent following a
motor vehicle stop for speeding.
The driver sought to suppress the
evidence on the grounds that it was an
illegal search.
Jacobs, the Atlantic City lawyer, said if
the Supreme Court had validated the Iowa
statute, the law effectively would have
rewritten search-and-seizure law.
"Any time an American motorist got
in his car, he could be subjected to a body
and car search at the will of a police
officer who chooses to issue a summons
for a failure to use an indicator."
Copyright ©1998 The New Jersey
Lawyer, Inc.
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COURT BARS FULL CAR SEARCH IN TRAFFIC VIOLATION
CASE
The Washington Post
Wednesday, December 9, 1998
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
Police may not conduct a full-blown
search of motorists and their vehicles
after pulling them over and ticketing them
for speeding or other minor traffic
violations, the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously yesterday.
In an opinion by Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist, the justices overturned a
lower court ruling that would have
extended the long-standing authority that
police have had to search through cars
when a motorist is arrested to include
nonarrest situations involving only traffic
citations.
The decision was a rare victory for a
defendant claiming police had illegally
rummaged through his car. In recent
decades, the justices have narrowly
interpreted the breadth of the Fourth
Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures,
particularly in regard to motorists, to give
police broad authority to look through
vehicles without first obtaining a warrant.
But the fact that yesterday's ruling was
unanimous shows how far the police
practice at issue in the case went.
The state of Iowa permitted police to
conduct a full search after writing up a
traffic citation. A handful of other states
had begun the practice but the policy in
most states has been to allow such
searches only when the driver has been
arrested and in custody.
The case, which was closely followed
by police organizations and civil
libertarians, began when a police officer in
a town near Des Moines stopped Patrick
Knowles for driving 43 miles per hour in
a 25 mph zone. The officer issued a
citation and then did a full search of
Knowles's car, finding some marijuana
and a "pot pipe." Knowles was later
charged with marijuana possession.
Knowles tried to keep the evidence
out of trial, contending that the officer
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court ruled in 1973 that
police can extensively search when a
driver is arrested, but Knowles maintained
that because he was not actually arrested,
there was no reason for a full-blown
search. The police officer had conceded
that he was not suspicious that Knowles
was involved in any criminal activity,
which might have given him grounds for
the search.
Lower courts ruled against Knowles,
reasoning that because Iowa law allowed
police to arrest someone for speeding,
rather than simply ticketing him, police
were allowed an extensive search.
But in reversing that ruling yesterday,
the Supreme Court pointed to the distinct
rationales for permitting a warrantless
search when a motorist is arrested: the
need to disarm the suspect so he can be
taken into custody and the need to
preserve evidence for a trial.
Rehnquist said neither of these
rationales could justify the search in
Knowles's case: "While the concern for
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officer safety in [a traffic stop] may justify
the 'minimal' additional intrusion of
ordering a driver and passengers out of
the car, it does not by itself justify the
often considerably greater intrusion
attending a full field-type search."
The chief justice added that a routine
speeding violation is unlikely to create the
need for preserving evidence. "Once
Knowles was stopped for speeding and
issued a citation, all the evidence
necessary to prosecute that offense had
been obtained," Rehnquist wrote in
Knowles v. Iowa. "No further evidence of
excessive speed was going to be found."







Supreme Court of the United States
Decided April 5, 1999
TOP COURT LIMITS CAR PASSENGER RIGHTS
Police Searches Can Include Others in Vehicle, Ruling Says
The Fort Worth Star-Telegram
Tuesday, April 6,1999
Lyle Denniston, The Baltimore Sun
WASHINGTON - Police can search
the belongings of passengers in cars
stopped for traffic violations under some
circumstances, even if the passengers are
not suspected of wrongdoing, the
Supreme Court ruled yesterday.
If officers have reason to believe that
the driver may have drugs or other illegal
items in the car, that allows them to
search purses or other personal property
of all passengers - even if no passenger is
suspected of a crime, the court decided by
a 6-3 vote.
Any container in the car that might
contain illegal items, the court said, may
be searched.
That authority, however, does not
extend to searching the clothing or body
of the passengers, the court stressed. It
said the Constitution draws a distinction
between searching persons and property,
but not between driver and passengers.
The dissenters complained that the
decision expands police search power
over passengers, based solely on the
driver's actual or suspected misconduct.
The ruling was the latest in a long
series of Supreme Court cases testing
police authority to search or conduct
questioning after they have made legal
traffic stops.
This time, the court overturned a
Wyoming Supreme Court decision saying
that it is unconstitutional for police to
search belongings of passengers in
stopped cars, when officers have no
suspicions about passengers themselves.
Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote the
opinion, said, "Effective law enforcement
would be appreciably impaired without
the ability to search a passenger's personal
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belongings when there is reason to believe
contraband or evidence of criminal
wrongdoing is hidden in the car."
The case involved the police search of
a female passenger's purse after the driver
- stopped for speeding and for a burned-
out brake light - was found to have a drug
syringe in his pocket. The driver admitted
that he had used it for drugs. The
passenger's purse was in the back seat.
After officers found illegal drugs and
drug paraphernalia in her purse, Sandra
Houghton was convicted for illegal
possession of drugs and sentenced to two
to three years in prison.
Joining Scalia in the decision were
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Anthony M.
Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor and
Clarence Thomas. Dissenting were
Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and David H. Souter.
Copyright C 1999 Star-Telegram
Newspaper, Inc.
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SUPREME COURT STEERS TWISTING ROUTE THROUGH
FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
Legal Times
Monday, June 7, 1999
Jeffrey Standen
The U.S. Supreme Court has tried
again to wriggle out of a problem it
created for itself more than 30 years ago.
It was in 1967 that the Court, in its
famous decisions in Katz v. United States
and Warden v. Hayden, obliterated the
"property" analysis that had regulated
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for
more than a century.
Despite its quaintness, the property
principle had rather neatly cabined police
activity, permitting the seizure of only
those items in which the government
could claim a property interest, usually via
the ancient doctrine of the deodand,
which held that the instrumentalities or
fruits of a crime belonged to the state, not
the perpetrator. Police could search for
and seize that which the government
owned, even if ownership were a fiction
of ancient law, and no more.
Few changes in law have done more
to alter the fundamental relations between
the government and the governed than
that produced by the new guiding
principle the Court announced in 1967.
Privacy, stated the Court, not the stodgy
old notion of property, would henceforth
govern Fourth Amendment law, and by
extension, shape the contours of relations
between the police and the citizenry.
Privacy is an unusually malleable term.
What was to be the definition of this
privacy? Would the Supreme Court
embark on a series of Roe v. Wade-like
cases, finding this particular interest or
that area of private discourse
constitutionally immune from
government snooping? The body politic
probably could not have accepted another
such strand of judicial activism.
Instead, the Court came to treat its
privacy notion not as the beginning of
analysis, but as its end, finding that
privacy is what's left after the government
is done regulating its subjects. Privacy
means a "reasonable expectation" of
privacy, and one's expectation of privacy
can't be reasonable if there's a federal
statute that mandates public disclosure,
now can it?
The circular phrase "reasonable
expectations of privacy" has come to
mean a definition of privacy few would
have expected. One's person is private,
for sure, as is one's house, and to search
them police must have a judicial warrant.
A car, however, is not a private place, or
at least not as private as a house, and so
police do not need a warrant to search it.
A car's trunk is more private than the
glove compartment, but less private than
a handbag, unless that handbag is in the
car, whereupon it's just a car. A mobile
home is a car unless it is hooked up to a
sewer, whereupon it's a house. You can
put barbed wire, guard dogs, and "Private,
No Trespassing" signs around your barn,
but it's not private--whereas your
unmown front lawn, bordering a busy
street in plain view, is.
The privacy rationale has for decades
kept the Court busily constructing silly
distinctions between the various ways
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Americans live and transport themselves.
Now the justices appear to have had
enough of this game.
WHEN IS A BAG NOT A HOUSE?
Here's the vexing intellectual problem
that has tried the Court's patience: We
know houses are more private than cars,
except for the trunk, which is closer to a
house but not quite, and that handbags,
like persons, are like a house. But what is
the rule of law when the unthinkable
happens, and a citizen takes that handbag
(a house) and puts it in a car (a car)? Is the
bag still a house? Or is it now a car? It's
not hooked up to a sewer, so the issue has
puzzled our brightest judicial minds.
Believe it or not, the Court has
struggled through five full opinions in the
past 20 years trying to figure this one out.
First, the Court said that bags are
"repositories of personal effects," and
thus are really houses, even when they are
inside a car. United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1 (1977).
Then the Court said that if the bag is
in the car and the officer is searching the
car, but not really looking for the bag, the
officer may search the bag. (Don't ask,
can't make it clearer.) United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
But if the officer is searching the car
for the bag and finds the bag, he can't
search it, at least not unless he gets a
warrant, as he would need with a house.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
Confused? Everyone was. Who
knows how many law school graduates
have failed the bar on this problem alone.
Finally, in what it thought was the last
word, the Court threw up its hands and,
in effect, just said "Search the stupid bag
if you're searching the car." A bag is a
house until it's put in the car, and then it's
a car. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991).
But all that changed April 5. It turns
out that some crafty Midwesterner, in a
case styled Wyoming v. Houghton, found
a secret loophole deep in the interstices of
constitutional law: He invited someone
else to travel in his car with him! And this
person cleverly subverted the Supreme
Court's entire criminal procedural system
by bringing a bag into that car! The police,
of course, being police, dutifully searched
the passenger's bag in the course of
searching the car.
THE HUMAN FACTOR
A car is not a house, and a bag, which
was a house, becomes a car when it's
placed in the car. But a person, some still
think, remains a person no matter where
that person happens to be. The Court
long ago even made clear, after careful
interpretation of constitutional text, that a
person who gets in the car is still a human
person. And police may not (yet) search a
person's bag, because the bag is so much
a part of the person that it's a house,
unless the bag is put into a car.
So here's the question: What is the bag if
it's in the car but also on the person?
When police search a car, we know
they can search bags, but we also know
they can't search a person. What is a bag?
In the trunk, it's a car. But what if it's in
the tight clutches of its owner in the back
seat? May the police wrest it away and
paw through it? If they do so, are they
searching a car or a house?
Or better, imagine that the
passenger/owner of the bag is ordered
from the car, as is typical practice to give
police unfettered access in auto searches.
May the passenger take her bag with her?
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And if she does, has she converted a car
into a house? May the police nevertheless
search it? Or may they order her to return
it to the backseat, reconverting it from a
house to a car, so they can rummage
through it?
In Houghton, the passenger left her
purse in the back seat, making it easy for
the Court to treat the bag as part of the
car, even though the searching officers
admittedly knew that the bag belonged to
a person other than the driver. But
criminals, especially in the drug trade,
seem able to manipulate legal doctrine
with greater facility than third-year law
students. The passenger in the next case
will know enough to take her drug-filled
purse with her, making it part of her
person, and thus opening a whole new
chapter in the Court's ongoing problem
with privacy.
Indeed, the smartest passenger will
take out as many bags as she can hold.
Suspects will hold a figurative house in
their hands. And unless the Supreme
Court wishes to put a premium on very
muscular drug mules, it will have little
choice but to say that bags, at least bags
that were recently in cars, are not houses
after all, but are still cars, and so police
may go ahead and search them without a
warrant when they have sufficient cause.
This step is both predictable and yet a
small step away from saying that bags are
just cars after all, and that police can
search citizens' bags on the street without
a warrant. Soon, we will have to worry
about bags, boxes, and other containers
inside houses--real houses, that is. In any
event, we will have arrived at a notion of
privacy that few would recognize, and
fewer would love.
Jeffrey Standen is a professor at
Willamette University College of Law in
Salem, Ore. This article originally
appeared on Open Court, the
commentary section of the Law News
Network (www.lawnewsnetwork.com), a
Web site affiliated with Legal Times.




Charles H. WILSON, et ux., et al., Petitioners
V.
Harry LAYNE, Deputy United States Marshal, etc., et al.
No. 98-83
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided May 24, 1999
POLICE CAN BE SUED FOR LETTING MEDIA SEE RAIDS
The Washington Post
Tuesday, May 25,1999
Joan Biskupic; Howard Kurtz, Washington Post Staff Writers
The Supreme Court ruled
unanimously yesterday that police can be
sued for letting reporters and
photographers accompany them on raids
of private homes, a decision that could
curtail a widespread practice of media
"ride-alongs" with law enforcement.
The justices said that police violate the
constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures when
they allow reporters and camera crews to
enter homes to observe law enforcement
first-hand and, in some cases, obtain the
dramatic footage that is now a staple of
television news and cop shows.
"[It is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment for police to bring members
of the media or other third parties into a
home during the execution of a warrant
when [their] presence ... was not in aid of
the execution of the warrant," Rehnquist
wrote regarding the case, which began
when a Washington Post reporter and
photographer burst into a Rockville
couple's home with police early one
morning in 1992.
The photographer took pictures of
resident Charles Wilson, who was dressed
only in undershorts, as an officer wrestled
him to the ground and put a gun to his
head, and his wife, Geraldine, who was
wearing a negligee. The deputies from the
Montgomery County sheriffs department
and the U.S. Marshal's office had been
looking for the Wilsons' son, Dominic,
who was a fugitive and who, it turned out,
was not in the home. The Wilsons sued
the officers under federal civil rights law.
Under the ruling, police could be
forced to pay damages if they bring
members of the media into private homes.
But the court said that in the Maryland
dispute and in a companion case from
Montana involving CNN, police would be
protected from liability because the law
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was not yet clear when the incidents took
place.
Rehnquist noted that government
officials, including law enforcement
officers, can have "qualified immunity"
from liability for civil damages if they
could not have known at the time that
what they were doing was wrong.
Rehnquist said that these cases met that
standard, with only Justice John Paul
Stevens dissenting from that part of the
ruling.
Although the legal question in
yesterday's case regarded only the officers'
liability for inviting the media along and
not the media's responsibility for taking
part in the action, the case had drawn
widespread press attention. Ride-alongs
involve a common collaboration: the
government wants publicity for its law
enforcement efforts, the press wants a
first-hand view of an arrest.
Lee Levine, who filed a friend-of-the-
court brief for 24 media organizations,
said "police and law enforcement will be
very reluctant to invite the media to come
along, whether we're talking about a home
or an open area or nding along in a police
car ... and that will have an unfortunate
effect on news reporting."
John Langley, executive producer of
the Fox program "COPS," said that "as a
so-called ride-along program, we are
unaffected by the decision because we
obtain releases from everyone involved in
our program. Moreover, we do not, under
any circumstances, violate rights of
privacy." But the releases could become a
moot point if police decide to bar cameras
from their raids.
"These shows are in that gray area
between entertainment and journalism,"
said Tom Rosenstiel of the Project for
Excellence in Journalism. "They're not
actually providing news. It's more
voyeurism with a tinge of moralism. ...
what it's like to ride with a cop, to be a
cop."
At The Post, which did not publish
the pictures taken during the Rockville
raid, Deputy Managing Editor Milton
Coleman said news-gathering practices
would be largely unaffected. "When we
ride along with the police, in most of
those circumstances we're observing the
police in public places," he said. But the
paper understands "that the individual
house is a threshold that you don't cross"
on police raids.
A CNN spokesman said the network
is studying the ruling.
Attorney Richard K. Willard, who
represents the Wilsons, said he was
pleased with the ruling because "it
protects people from the indignity of
having their homes invaded by reporters."
Although the Wilsons' civil rights claim
has been shut down, Willard noted that a
separate federal tort claim was still
pending.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the
two cases in part because federal courts
had produced contradictory rulings.
In the Maryland case, Wilson v. Layne,
the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that police did not violate the
Wilsons' rights because past court cases
did not plainly forbid police from taking
reporters with them to witness an arrest.
But in the Montana case, Hanlon v.
Berger, which arose after federal agents
brought along a CNN crew while
searching the ranch of a man suspected of
poisoning protected eagles, the 9th Circuit
said "no reasonable officer would have
thought it permissible" to allow the press
to be present.
In yesterday's cases, the Supreme
Court made clear that the Fourth
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Amendment does not permit police to
bring along the press or any third party
who is not part of the law enforcement
mission. Rehnquist emphasized the
sanctity of the home and the residential
privacy at the core of the Fourth
Amendment, dismissing the argument that
ride-alongs serve a public relations
function and help ensure against police
misconduct.
Montgomery County Sheriff Ray
Kight, who was named in the Wilsons'
suit along with three of his deputies, said
he was relieved by the court's finding that
Montgomery sheriffs officials have
immunity from the lawsuit.
"It gives law enforcement throughout
the country new guidelines where we
didn't have any before," he said. But he
added, "I think it will definitely have a
chilling effect on press coverage" of law
enforcement.
Staff writers Sharon Waxman and
Katherine Shaver contributed to this
report.
Copyright C 1999 The Washington Post
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The reggae beat pulses. "Bad boys,
bad boys, whatcha gonna do? Whatcha
gonna do when they come for you?"
Some unidentified ne'er-do-well is led
away in handcuffs, his face mottled by a
computerized mosaic. Local Officer
Friendly confidently explains where this
particular culprit went wrong.
Another day, another airing of "Cops."
And what a sigh of relief devoted
"Cops" fans breathed when they learned
that their beloved show would not be
yanked off the air by the caprice of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wilson
v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999), the so-
called media ride-along case.
Under Wilson, police officers are no
longer supposed to let reporters,
photographers, or videographers go with
them when they execute a search warrant
at someone's home. "Cops" is not
affected because the show's producers get
permission from everyone involved
before airing an episode. Even the bad
guys consent to the production.
But what about the less dramatic news
gathering by beat reporters and
investigators from both print and
electronic oulets? Does Wilson intend to
attack the hype often seen in "real life"
television police dramas or quash the
media's legitimate role of oversight?
Because the media's presence during a
valid search violates the Fourth
Amendment, according to Wilson,
"arresting" entertainment will continue
unabated, while beneficial mainstream
news gathering will not.
The facts of Wilson are fairly well-
known. In 1992, a Rockville, Md., couple
awoke early one morning to find police
officers in their home. The police had a
valid warrant to search the Wilsons' home
for their adult son, who was wanted for
probation violations. Mr. Wilson, clad
only in his underwear, was pinned on the
floor while Mrs. Wilson stood by, wearing
a sheer nightgown. The Wilsons' son
wasn't there, so the couple was let go.
Observing all of this were a reporter
and a photographer from The
Washington Post. The reporter took notes
while the photographer clicked away, but
the Post did not publish any of the
pictures.
The Wilsons sued the police officers
for civil rights violations under 42 U.S. C.
Section 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), both of which allow for recovery
of damages from government actors.
Government actors have qualified
immunity from Bivens or Section 1983
suits. The plaintiff must allege that he or
she was deprived of an actual
constitutional right and that the right was
clearly established at the time of the
violation. If neither condition is met, the
government actors are entitled to
judgment.
The Wilsons claimed that their Fourth
Amendment rights were violated. There
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was no question that the search warrant
itself was valid. The claim of wrongdoing
was based on the fact that the police had
brought the media along, and their
presence made the search unreasonable,
and thus invalid, under the Constitution.
Unanswered Questions
Much has been made about the
Court's recitation of a quote from a 1604
English decision that "the house of every
one is to him as his castle and fortress, as
well for his defence against injury and
violence, as for his repose." Backers of
Wilson embrace the quote to ridicule the
press for voraciously invading personal
privacy in the name of the First
Amendment.
Meanwhile, the press--unhappy with
the Supreme Court's ruling--nevertheless
embraces the quote, too, as proof that
Wilson applies only to ride-alongs that go
into people's homes. In the media's view,
a ride-along for other police work is still
viable.
Is it?
The hoary quote is powerful. And
throughout the opinion--indeed in the
holding itself--the Court uses the word
"home" to limit the reach of its rule: "it is
a violation of the Fourth Amendment for
police to bring members of the media or
other third parties into a home during the
execution of a warrant when the presence
of the third parties in the home was not in
aid of the execution of the warrant."
But the Court devotes considerable
ink to discuss generally the legitimate
presence of third parties whenever a
search warrant is carried out. Other
portions of the opinion downplay the
public and/or police interest in having a
media representative present during the
execution of police business.
In deciding whether the police had
violated an actual constitutional right, the
Court correctly states that the Fourth
Amendment protects the homeowners
from entry without a warrant. There was a
warrant in this case, so next the Court
asks if the warrant was properly limited in
scope. The justices conclude, "no,"
because the media's presence, by
definition, exceeded the warrant's scope.
That raises some interesting
propositions. Take, for example, the
instance where police officers bring in one
of their own photographers,
videographers, or sketch artists. Or maybe
the police department contracts with
freelance photographers to record certain
police maneuvers. The Court says it
would be OK for these people to be
present, even if they were not listed on
the search warrant, if it is part of a
" 'quality control' effort to ensure that the
rights of homeowners are being respected,
or even to preserve evidence." But the
Court also asserts that the presence of
these authorized third parties is
"significantly different from the media
presence in this case."
The difference is illusory.
In both situations, the interest is in
documenting the proper execution of
police business. In both cases, a
permanent record is created. In neither
case is the third party actually carrying out
the search warrant.
Ironically, there is as much of a
chance--if not more--that the public
would see photos taken by the police
photographer than they would those
taken by the press. The pictures, videos,
or notes taken by police would likely be
governed by a state open records statute
once any investigation connected to the
records was closed or the investigation
record is otherwise published by the
police or government agency (e.g., the
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Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug
Enforcement Administration, or a local
prosecutor). That means that every photo
could be obtained, copied, and distributed
by any citizen in that state without
restriction. The press photos and notes
may admittedly have greater
dissemination, but they may not be used
at all, and much of what is recorded will
be thrown out.
In the wake of Wilson, there is scant
assurance that the police can rely on
qualified immunity in future situations
where the press seeks to observe police
business. We can expect that many police
chiefs around the country will decide that
the media's presence at police functions is
not worth the potential liability.
Crime scenes or disaster areas could
be cordoned off to the press. Access to
such sites has typically been proscribed by
law enforcement officers, balancing the
public's need to know against the police's
need to preserve evidence and public
safety. The Court's opinion suddenly
turns reporters and photographers into
villains. Their presence, whether in a
home or at an accident scene, will be seen
by police as a nuisance that invites liability
instead of inspiring confidence.
The police (and, in a sense, the public)
have long relied on the media. The police
carry out the public's business, while the
media confirm to the public that the
business is being done and shows the
public how. The police benefit because
citizens want to know that their men in
blue are keeping their streets safe. The
greater sense of safety, in turn, builds the
common weal.
On the other hand, the media's
presence often provides the unstated
check on potential brutality. The camera
lens undoubtedly thwarts thoughts of
overzealous police action.
The Court in Wilson, however,
stubbornly ignores that interrelationship
by hammering at the fact that "The
Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons'
home were working on a story for their
own purposes. They were not present for
the purpose of protecting the officers,
much less the Wilsons." The Court makes
it sound as if the Post, or any other
member of the media, collects
information for the sole purpose of
compiling dossiers on the general
citizenry. Such an implication is as
insulting to the press as it would be to
government officials.
Perhaps with visions of popular
television re-creations of crime scenes in
mind, the Court appears hostile to the fact
that media outlets are also businesses--
that while they collect information to pass
onto the public, they are also striving to
keep revenue flowing. By describing
stories on police activities as being for
"private purposes, " the Court
undermines the very function of a free
press.
The decision also suggests a hostility
toward traditional press functions. The
fact that the justices accepted this case for
review in the first place is suspect. Wilson
does not break any new ground in civil
rights jurisprudence. It merely takes a set
of facts and determines if they fit the
definition of clearly defined rights. Such
determinations are usually left up to the
lower courts.
The facts of the Wilson case are not
particularly egregious, either. The reporter
and photographer did not participate in
the warrant's execution. Perhaps most
important, the photos of the wrongly
suspected Mr. Wilson were never
published. Compare those facts to those
of Hanlon v. Berger, a companion case,
but on which the Court issued no
substantive opinion. In Hanlon, CNN
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contracted with federal agents to ride
along on an investigation of a Montana
rancher suspected of poisoning golden
eagles. The agents wore hidden recording
devices supplied by CNN; the network
crew was not identified as being with the
press; CNN broadcast portions of both
the audio and the video recordings, yet
the rancher was acquitted of the
poisoning charges.
By choosing Wilson instead of
Hanlon on which to rest its ruling, the
Court painted with a broad brush all
media as irresponsible mercenaries.
People are to be free from unjustified
governmental invasions into their home.
The bottom line in the Wilson case is that
the governmental invasion was justified--
the warrant was unquestionably valid. The
fact that media representatives--at police
invitation--were there to observe in no
way alters the propriety of a police action
under current civil rights law.
Instead, the mainstream press has
been unnecessarily scapegoated, while
"Cops" beams nightly into homes without
context, commentary, or possible criticism
of government activities. While the Court
through Wilson may have tried to pull the
plug on glorified "real life" police dramas,
the decision will only undermine
legitimate and beneficial news gathering.
Richard M. Knoth is a partner in the
Cleveland office of Arter & Hadden. He
specializes in unfair business practice
litigation and has handled numerous trials
and appeals addressing constitutional
issues.
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TOP COURT OFFERS SHORT-TERM GUESTS LITTLE
HOSPITALITY
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
Wednesday, December 9, 1998
David W. Gleicher
The U.S. Supreme Court is good for
about one controversial search and seizure
decision each term, and this year is no
exception.
Last week, the court held in
Minnesota v. Carter, No. 97-1147 (Dec.
1), that the ability to claim Fourth
Amendment privacy rights depends on
how long one stays as a guest in the host's
home.
It all started in a Minneapolis suburb
when police officer James Thielen
received a tip that people in a ground-
floor apartment were bagging a white
powder. Thielen went to investigate and
looked through the apartment window. (A
gap in the blinds enabled Thielen to see
the bagging operation the tipster had
described.)
Then two men, later identified as
defendants Wayne Carter and Melvin
Johns, left the apartment in a Cadillac.
Police stopped the car and ordered the
two out of it. At that point, the cops saw a
gun on the floor. A more thorough search
revealed cocaine, pagers and a scale. The
cops also searched the apartment, where
they found Kimberly Thompson, the
occupant, as well as more coke.
Police later learned that while
Thompson rented the apartment, Carter
and Johns, who lived in Chicago, had
never been there before that day and had
been in the apartment for only about 21/2
hours bagging the drugs. In return for the
use of the apartment, the two had given
Thompson an "eight ball" (one-eighth of
an ounce) of coke.
Carter and Johns moved to suppress
the evidence obtained from the Caddy and
apartment. They argued that Thielen's
initial observation of their drug activities
was an unreasonable search in violation of
388
the Fourth Amendment and that all
evidence obtained as a result of that
search should be ruled inadmissible as
"fruit of the poisonous tree."
The Minnesota trial court didn't buy
that argument, holding that Carter and
Johns, as temporary visitors, were not
entitled to claim a Fourth Amendment
right to home privacy. The Minnesota
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
Carter and Johns had standing to claim
the protection of the Fourth Amendment
because they were invited guests in
Thompson's home. The court ruled that
Thielen's observation constituted a search
of the apartment, and that such a search
was unreasonable. The State of Minnesota
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
wrote the court's majority opinion,
beginning with the following proposition:
To claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, a defendant must
demonstrate that he personally has an
expectation of privacy in the place
searched, and that his expectation is
reasonable.
Rehnquist then noted that the
language of the Fourth Amendment
guarantees the rights of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects. "Their" indicates that the
Fourth Amendment is a personal right
that must be invoked by the individual
claiming it. However, he said, whether an
individual can claim a Fourth Amendment
right -- a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the invaded space -- depends on where
that person is.
The chief justice wrote that while the
text of the amendment could imply that
its protections extend to only people
claiming those protections in their own
homes, the case of Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91 (1990), was more generous.
Olson held that an overnight guest in a
house had the expectation of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
However, here were two men who were
not sleeping over but were merely using
the apartment as a spot to bag drugs.
Do they have the same privacy rights
as overnight guests? No, the court held.
An overnight guest in a home may
claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, but one who is merely
present with the consent of the
householder may not, Rehnquist declared.
A guest who is sleeping over is using the
apartment as a dwelling place, albeit
temporarily; Carter and Johns were using
the apartment merely for business
purposes. The expectation of privacy in
property used for business, Rehnquist
wrote, is less than the expectation of
privacy in a home.
So, was Officer Thielen's search
though the blinds unreasonable? Because
we conclude that respondents had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the
apartment, we need not decide that issue.
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruling was
reversed, and the case remanded for
further proceedings.
Justice Antonin Scalia and his partner,
Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a
concurring opinion filled with obscure
and vague historical references, finally
asserting that it is up to the legislatures to
determine the extent of privacy.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
concurred, holding that if Kimberly
Thompson would have objected to the
search being unreasonable (she was not a
respondent here), she would have had a
good argument. Carter and Johns,
however, do not have standing to object
to the search.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, a voice of
logic here, seems to hold the opposite of
Kennedy. In his concurrence, Breyer says
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Carter and Johns do have the right to
claim Fourth Amendment privacy rights,
despite being only temporary visitors to
the apartment. However, Breyer
concurred in the judgment because
Thielen's peeping through the blinds was
not an unreasonable search. If you want
privacy through a window facing a public
way, close your blinds all the way, Breyer
wrote in a helpful hint.
justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
dissented, joined by Justices David H.
Souter and John Paul Stevens. Ginsburg
wrote that part of the definition of privacy
in a home is the right to exclude some
people and include others. If Thompson
invites Carter and Johns into her
apartment, she is extending her
expectation of privacy to her guests,
whether those guests are overnighters or
transient.
Ginsburg expressed worries that
police may be tempted by the court's
majority opinion to enter homes without
warrants, hoping that some of the people
inside will prove to be temporary visitors
like Carter and Johns.
And if they're not, the police will say,
"OOps, we made a mistake."
While the court's decision was on a 6-
3 vote, Breyer's tempered concurrence
really makes it a narrower 5-4 split against
giving temporary guests Fourth
Amendment rights of privacy.
Will Ginsburg's fears of increased
warrantless home entries come true? That
is uncertain, but the prospects of such a
result was enough to lead the usually staid
Chicago Tribune to rip this decision in a
Dec. 7 editorial. Criminal Defense By
David W. Gleicher Gleicher practices
criminal defense and general civil
litigation. He is a graduate of the
University of Chicago Law School, a
member of the Federal Defender Panel of
Attorneys, and author of "Louis Brandeis
Slept Here." For information on ordering
the book from Gefen Publishing, call
(800) 477-5257. An overnight guest in a
home may claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment, but one who is
merely present with the consent of the
householder may not.'
Copyright C 1998 Law Bulletin Publishing
Company
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COURT LIMITS GUESTS' RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Dissent Warns That Ruling Allows Police to Pry Into Homes
The Washington Post
Wednesday, December 2, 1998
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Witer
The Supreme Court yesterday limited
the privacy rights of guests invited over to
someone's home, rejecting the idea that
visitors share their host's constitutional
protection from unreasonable police
searches.
The 5-4 ruling, in which the
conservative justices seized the majority,
provoked a strong warning from
dissenting justices who contend that the
ruling represents a new threat to personal
security and will tempt police to pry into
private homes.
The majority's narrow reading of the
Fourth Amendment safeguard against
police intrusions is consistent with the
law-and-order bent of the high court in
recent years, but it nonetheless marks a
shift from a 1990 ruling in which the
justices said a guest who spends the night
at someone's home has a legitimate
expectation of privacy.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
who had dissented in 1990, wrote
yesterday for the court, "[A]n overnight
guest in a home may claim the protection
of the Fourth Amendment, but one who
is merely present with the consent of the
householder may not."
The decision reinstated the drug
conspiracy convictions of two Minnesota
men who were seen bagging cocaine by a
police officer peeking through drawn
window blinds.
Yesterday's decision is significant both
in an era of stepped-up police vigilance
and increased national concern for
government intrusions on privacy,
whether through modem techniques such
as electronic eavesdropping or old-
fashioned window snooping.
In a forcefully worded dissent, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg said the decision
"undermines not only the security of
short-term guests, but also the security of
the home resident herself."
When someone "personally invites a
guest into her home ... whether it be for
conversation, to engage in leisure
activities, or for business purposes licit or
illicit, that guest should share his host's
shelter against unreasonable searches and
seizures," Ginsburg wrote in a dissenting
opinion, signed by Justices John Paul
Stevens and David H. Souter and
endorsed by Justice Stephen G. Breyer.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits
unreasonable searches, and courts have
long required individuals who want to
protest a police search -- typically to stop
seized evidence from being introduced at
trial -- to show that they had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the place that
was searched. Yesterday's case was
important in addressing the privacy rights
of a short-term guest, as opposed to the
homeowner or someone who stays
overnight.
The dispute began when a police
officer in the Twin Cities suburb of
Eagan, Minn., investigated a tip from an
informant who reported drug activities in
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a ground-floor apartment. Without
obtaining a search warrant, the officer
looked through a gap in the closed blinds
and saw Wayne Thomas Carter and
Melvin Jones bagging a white substance
with a woman, who (it turned out) lived in
the apartment. After the men left the
apartment and got into their car, police
arrested them and seized 47 grams of
cocaine.
At their trial, Carter and Johns sought
to have the evidence suppressed on the
grounds that the police officer's initial
observation of their drug activity
amounted to an unconstitutional search.
The trial judge disagreed, and Carter
and Johns were convicted. But the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed that
decision, ruling that even though "society
does not recognize as valuable the task of
bagging cocaine, we conclude that society
does recognize as valuable the right of
property owners or leaseholders to invite
persons into the privacy of their homes."
In overturning that decision, the
Supreme Court emphasized that Carter
and Johns were in the apartment for only
about 2 1/2 hours and that they were
engaged in a commercial endeavor.
Joining Rehnquist in the ruling that
the short-term visitors had no legitimate
privacy expectations were Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony
M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.
Kennedy wrote separately, saying that
"social guests have a legitimate
expectation of privacy" and suggesting
that a person who claimed that he was a
purely social visitor might be able to claim
protection from a police search.
Separately, Justice Breyer agreed with
the dissenters that the defendants had a
privacy right, but voted to reinstate the
cocaine convictions, saying the police
officer acted reasonably in looking in the
window after getting a tip.
Attorney James Backstrom, who
represented Minnesota in the case against
Carter and Johns, said the ruling would
give police greater leeway in investigating
drug dealers. But Boston University law
professor Tracey Macln, who wrote a
brief for the American Civil Liberties
Union in Minnesota v. Carter, said the
ruling is an invitation to police to pry into
homes.
Copyright C 1998 The Washington Post
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ILLINOIS v. WARDLOW
Does Running From the Polce Give Cause to Stop and Search?
Matthew Curtis *
Sam Wardlow, a convicted felon, was standing on the sidewalk along West Van Buren, in
Chicago - a neighborhood plagued by drug trafficking. Wardlow carried a bulky white
envelope that contained a .38 cal. revolver, loaded with five rounds. As a caravan of four
police vehicles (possibly unmarked) approached, Wardlow looked at one of the uniformed
officers in the rear car and bolted down the sidewalk, running into an alley. The police
immediately gave pursuit and eventually caught Wardlow at which time they frisked him and
discovered the handgun. Wardlow was subsequently convicted for being a felon in
possession of a handgun.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, threw out the conviction after ruling that the
revolver was inadmissible as evidence due to an illegal search. The Illinois court applied the
standard provided by the Supreme Court in Tery v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in ruling that
simply fleeing from the police was not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify an investigatory
stop.
In Ter y v. Ohio, Terry was arrested as he and two other men stood talking on the
sidewalk. After observing two of the men for more than ten minutes, a detective approached
the men, identified himself, and asked them their names. When they mumbled their
responses, the detective immediately frisked them, finding revolvers on Terry and one of the
other men. The two armed men were then arrested for carrying concealed weapons. During
the time that the detective had observed the two men, they repeatedly took turns walking
down the sidewalk and peering into the window of a store. The detective later stated that he
suspected they were "casing" the store in order to rob it.
The Supreme Court upheld Terry's conviction. Chief Justice Warren concluded "that
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he
is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
and others' safety," the police officer may conduct a cursory search of the suspect's clothing
for weapons. Thus, the Warren Court provided a standard that must be applied based on
the specific circumstances of each case.
Having agreed to hear Illinois v. Wardlow, the current Court must compare the case to
Terry and determine if the circumstances in Wardlow are sufficiently similar to warrant the
police officer's stopping and frisking of Wardlow. Specifically, they must decide whether a
"person's sudden and unprovoked flight from [a] clearly identifiable police officer, who is
patrolling [a] high crime area, [is] sufficiently suspicious to justify [a] temporary investigatory
stop."
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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Because Terry requires that the Court second-guess the judgment of police officers, it is
impossible to guess how the Court might decide Wardlow. However, the Court may follow
the Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning and decide that running from police does not
constitute "reasonable suspicion." Alternatively, the Court could rule that running
presumptively establishes the requisite "reasonable suspicion."
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98-1036 Illinois v. Wardlow
Ruling below (Ill., 183 Ill.2d 306, 701 N.E.2d 484, 64 Crim. L. Rep. 32):
Individual's flight upon approach of police officers is, by itself, insufficient to create
reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal conduct so as to justify stop under Tery v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), regardless of whether person is in high-crime area.
Question presented: Is person's sudden and unprovoked flight from clearly identifiable
police officer, who is patrolling high crime area, sufficiently suspicious to justify temporary
investigatory stop pursuant to Terr v. Ohio?
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The People of the State of ILLINOIS, Appellee,
V.
Sam WARDLOW, Appellant
Supreme Court of Illinois
Decided September 24, 1998
Justice HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Sam Wardlow, was
convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by
a felon (citation omitted) following a
stipulated bench trial in Cook County and
was sentenced to a term of two years'
imprisonment. On appeal, the appellate
court reversed defendant's conviction,
finding that defendant's motion to
suppress evidence should have been
granted because the revolver seized from
him was discovered as a result of an
improper investigatory stop. 287
Ill.App.3d 367. We allowed the State's
petition for leave to appeal. (citation
omitted)
At the hearing on defendant's motion
to suppress, Officer Timothy Nolan
testified that on September 9, 1995, he
and his partner, Officer Harvey, were
assigned to the special operations section
of the Chicago police department. On that
date, Nolan and Harvey were among eight
officers in four cars travelling eastbound
on West Van Buren Street with the
purpose of investigating narcotics sales in
that area. Nolan stated that he was
working in uniform, but did not recall
whether the police car he drove, the last in
the "caravan," was marked or unmarked.
Nolan testified that as he was driving,
he observed defendant standing in front
of 4035 West Van Buren. Defendant,
who did not appear to be violating any
laws, looked in the officers' direction and
then fled. Nolan turned his vehicle
southbound toward Congress Avenue,
continuing to observe defendant, who ran
southbound through a gangway and then
through an alley. Nolan stated that
defendant, who was carrying a white
opaque bag under his arm, was cornered
in the vicinity of 4036 West Congress
when he "ran right towards us."
Nolan exited his car and stopped
defendant. Without announcing his office
or asking any questions, he conducted a
protective pat-down search of defendant.
Nolan testified that he could not see
inside the bag defendant was carrying so
he "squeezed" the bag and felt a very
heavy, hard object "that had a similar
shape to a revolver or a gun." Believing
the object to be a weapon, Nolan opened
the bag and found a .38-caliber handgun
containing five live rounds of
ammunition. Nolan then placed
defendant under arrest. (footnote
omitted)
Responding to the State's question as
to why he "went to that location on that
date and time," Nolan answered that it
was "one of the areas in the 11th District
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that's high narcotics traffic." Nolan
further testified that, based upon his
experience in investigating areas in which
narcotics were sold, it was common for
there to be weapons "in the near vicinity"
and he considered that fact as he
approached "that specific scene." After
hearing arguments by the parties, the trial
court denied defendant's motion to
suppress.
The fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees the "right
of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. This
provision applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve
only a brief detention short of traditional
arrest. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975); People v. Smithers, 83
Ill.2d 430, 433-34 (1980). In Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court held that the public's
interest in effective law enforcement
makes it reasonable to detain and question
individuals under certain circumstances in
which probable cause to arrest is lacking.
However, in order to protect "the
individual's right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law
officers" (Brignoni-Ponce, at 878), the Terrp
Court held that such limited investigatory
stops are permissible only upon a
reasonable suspicion based upon specific
and articulable facts that the person has
committed, or is about to commit, a
crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; Smithers,
83 Ill.2d at 434.
This Terry standard has been codified
in our Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963. (citation omitted) Section 107-14
of the Code provides, in pertinent part:
"A peace officer . .. may stop any person
in a public place for a reasonable period
of time when the officer reasonably infers
from the circumstances that the person is
committing, is about to commit or has
committed an offense.. . ." (citation
omitted) The same standard is applied in
determining the propriety of an
investigatory stop under article I, section
6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
(citation omitted). See People v. Tisler, 103
Ill.2d 226, 242-43 (1984) (the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures
under the Illinois Constitution is
measured by the same standards as are
used in defining the protections contained
in the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution).
Turning to the case before us,
defendant contended on direct appeal that
the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress because his presence in a
high-crime area and flight from police
were insufficient to justify his
investigatory stop. The appellate court
agreed, but found the record "simply too
vague to support the inference that
defendant was in a location with a high
incidence of narcotics trafficking" and
limited its holding accordingly. (citation
omitted) However, we believe Officer
Nolan's uncontradicted and undisputed
testimony, which was accepted by the trial
court, was sufficient to establish that the
incident occurred in a high-crime area. See
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996) (as a general matter determinations
of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause should be reviewed de novo on
appeal, but reviewing court should take
care both to review findings of fact only
for clear error and to give due weight to
inferences drawn from those facts by
judges and local law enforcement
officers). Thus, the issue presented by
this appeal is whether an individual's flight
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upon the approach of a police vehicle
patrolling a high-crime area is sufficient to
justify an investigative stop of the person.
Defendant contends that such flight alone
is insufficient to create a reasonable
suspicion of involvement in criminal
conduct. We agree.
A majority of jurisdictions addressing
this issue have held that flight alone is
insufficient to justify a Tery stop. (citation
omitted) "Instead, courts require proof of
some independently suspicious
circumstance to corroborate the inference
of a guilty conscience associated with
flight at the sight of the police.
[Citations.]" State v. Hicks, 241 Neb. at
362-63, 488 N.W.2d at 363; (citation
omitted)
In Hicks, the Nebraska Supreme Court
examined a number of these "location
plus evasion" cases and, in a
well-reasoned opinion, concluded:
[A]llowing flight alone to justify an
investigative stop would undercut
the very values Terry sought to
safeguard. Terry is based in part
upon the proposition that the right
to freedom from arbitrary
governmental intrusion is as
valuable on the street as it is in the
home. Thus, while a police officer
does not violate the Fourth
Amendment by approaching an
individual in a public place and
asking if the person will answer
some questions, neither is the
person under any obligation to
answer. Florida v. Rqyer, 460 U.S.
491 (1983). The person may decline
to listen to the questions at all and
simply go on his or her way. Id. If
the option to 'move on' is chosen,
the person 'may not be detained
even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds for
doing so; and his refusal to listen or
answer does not, without more,
furnish those grounds.' 460 U.S. at
498. * * * Flight upon approach of
a police officer may simply reflect
the exercise-'at top speed'--of the
person's constitutional right to '
"move on." ' Shaba, 424 Mich. at
63, 378 N.W.2d at 460. Terry and
Royer stand for the proposition that
exercise of this constitutional right
may not itself provide the basis for
more intrusive police activity.
A prime concern underlying the
Terry decision is protecting the right
of law-abiding citizens to eschew
interactions with the police.
Authorizing the police to chase
down and question all those who
take flight upon their approach
would undercut this important right
and upset the balance struck in Terry
between the individual's right to
personal security and the public's
interest in prevention of crime. We
therefore join those jurisdictions
holding that flight from a police
officer is sufficient to justify an
investigatory stop only when
coupled with specific knowledge
connecting the person to
involvement in criminal conduct.
[Citations.]
Hicks, at 363-64, 488 N.W.2d at 363-64.
Although no Illinois court has
specifically considered whether sudden
flight from police in a high-crime area
justifies a stop, we agree with the appellate
court that "[i]n Illinois, neither a person's
mere presence in an area where drugs are
sold (citation ommitted) nor sudden flight
(citation ommitted) alone will justify a
Terry stop." (citation onmitted); see also
People v. Fox, 97 Ill.App.3d 58, 421 N.E.2d
1082 (1981) (driving away at approach of
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marked police vehicle not a justification
for stop). Moreover, this court has
recently emphasized the importance of
protecting the freedom to engage in such
harmless activities as "loafing, loitering,
and nightwalking" and other personal
liberties of citizens, including the right to
travel, to locomotion, to freedom of
movement, and to associate with others.
City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53
(1997), cert. granted, 118 S.Ct. 1510.
In Morales, we found that a City of
Chicago ordinance which prohibited
certain individuals from loitering in public
places violated substantive due process
because it unreasonably infringed on "the
personal liberty of being able to freely
walk the streets and associate with
friends." Morales, at 460-61. We find
similarly unreasonable the State's
proposal, in the instant case, that every
person observed in "sudden and
unprovoked flight" from an officer may
be stopped regardless of whether the
surrounding circumstances indicate the
person is involved in criminal activity. Cf
People v. Holdman, 73 Ill.2d 213, 22 Ill.Dec.
679, 383 N.E.2d 155 (1978) (defendants'
flight following officers' shining bright
light into vehicle they reasonably believed
to be associated with fugitive for whom
they had warrant was indication of
criminal activity requiring police pursuit).
As defendant suggests, "[i]f the police
cannot constitutionally force otherwise
law-abiding citizens to move, the police
cannot force those same citizens to stand
still at the appearance of an officer."
Therefore, because we agree with the
majority of courts that view the
unequivocal flight of a suspect upon
seeing police as not alone indicative of
criminal activity, we now examine the
record herein to determine if there are
corroborating circumstances sufficient to
create the reasonable suspicion necessary
for the stop of defendant.
The case before us is factually similar
to People v. Mamon, 173 Mich.App. 429,
435 N.W.2d 12 (1988), rev'd on other
grounds,435 Mich. 1, 457 N.W.2d 623
(1990). There, two police officers were
driving on routine patrol in a marked
squad car through an area known for
narcotics activity. As the officers
approached the defendant, Mamon,
standing on a corner near a public phone,
he took off running. The officers pursued
the defendant on foot, noticing that he
removed a case from his pocket and
dropped it during the chase. The officers
ultimately caught the defendant and
retrieved the case, which contained
cocaine. The trial court quashed an
information charging the defendant with
possession of a controlled substance, and
the State appealed.
The Michigan appeals court affirmed
the trial court's decision, first addressing
the circumstances existing before the
defendant began to run. Though the
incident occurred in a high-crime
neighborhood, the court determined that
a person's presence in such an area
cannot, by itself, provide the basis for an
investigatory stop. In so doing, the court
noted that the officers were not
responding to a particular complaint of
wrongdoing in the area and that the
defendant made no furtive gestures prior
to seeing the officers. Concluding that the
officers lacked an articulable basis for
stopping the defendant as he stood on the
corner, the court turned to the
significance of his flight upon their
approach. Noting the ambiguous nature
of flight as an indicator of guilt, the court
held that the act of running at the sight of
police patrolling a high-crime area did not
provide the particularized grounds
necessary to support a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
Mamon, 173 Mich.App. at 435-38, 435
N.W.2d at 14-16.
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Here, similar to Mamon, Officers
Nolan and Harvey were "caravaning" with
several other police vehicles when the
incident occurred. They were not
responding to any call or report of
suspicious activity in the area. Though
Officer Nolan testified that that area of
the 11th District is known for "high
narcotics traffic," we agree with our
appellate court's opinion in Harper, 237
Ill.App.3d at 205-06, 603 N.E.2d 115, and
the numerous decisions from other
jurisdictions, holding that a person's
presence in such an area by itself does not
warrant a suspicion that that person is
involved in crime. See Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47 (1979); (citations omitted).
It is also clear that defendant herein
gave no outward indication of
involvement in illicit activity prior to the
approach of Officer Nolan's vehicle.
Defendant was simply standing in front of
a building when the officers drove by. As
in Mamon, the officers lacked an
articulable basis for suspecting defendant
of involvement in criminal activity prior to
the point at which he turned and ran.
In Fox, the Illinois case which most
closely approximates the issue presented
herein, the appellate court foreshadowed
our concerns, stating:
At the time of the stop, the
investigating officers were aware
that 'partying and littering' had
recently occurred in the * *
area and also that the vehicle in
which the defendant was riding as a
passenger exited the area at a speed
which one officer believed to be
unreasonable upon the approach of
a squad car. But, the officers
testifying on behalf of the State did
not relate that any additional
suspicious or unusual activities that
would have alerted the police to the
possibility of criminality were carried
on by the occupants of the
automobile.
In short, the evidence adduced
in this case does not support the
State's contention that the police
were aware of specific and
articulable facts to justify the stop
here. Rather, the evidence suggests
that the police officers were
operating under a suspicion or
hunch that the vehicle contained
someone who had committed or
was about to commit a crime."
(Emphasis added.)
Fox, 97 Ill.App.3d at 63-64, 421 N.E.2d
1082. Here, as in Fox, in the absence of
circumstances corroborating the
conclusion that defendant was involved in
criminal activity, Officer Nolan's
testimony reveals nothing more than a
hunch.
As our brethren on the Supreme
Court of Colorado have so aptly stated:
We are aware that the weighty social
objective of crime prevention might
well be served by permitting stops
and detentions without any
requirement of a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity has
occurred or is about to take place.
In the absence of specific and
articulable facts supporting the
reasonable suspicion, however, "the
balance between the public interest
and [defendant's] right to personal
security and privacy tilts in favor of
freedom from police interference."
Brown v. Texas, [443 U.S.] at 52, 99
S.Ct. at 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d at 363.
Thomas, 660 P.2d at 1277.
Where, as here, the police stop is not
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based upon objective cnteia pointing to a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
"the risk of arbitrary and abusive police
practices exceeds tolerable limits." Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 52.
Therefore, because Officer Nolan was
not able to point to specific facts
corroborating the inference of guilt
gleaned from defendant's flight, his stop
and subsequent arrest of defendant were
constitutionally infirm. U.S. Const.,
amend. IV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6.
The appellate court, therefore, properly
reversed the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
The weapon that was the basis for
defendant's conviction should have been
suppressed as the product of the
unconstitutional seizure of his person.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
(1963).
For the foregoing reasons, the
judgment of the appellate court, reversing





SUSPECT'S FLIGHT SUPPORTS SEARCH, COURT TOLD
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
Wednesday, May 13,1998
David Heckelnan; Law Bulletin Staff Writer
A Cook County prosecutor tried
convincing the Illinois Supreme Court
Wednesday that a person's abrupt flight
from the police is sufficient cause for
officers to stop and search him.
"When a person suddenly runs from
the police, any reasonable officer should
be allowed to conduct an investigatory
stop," Assistant Cook County State's
Attorney Veronica Ximena Calderon told
the justices during oral arguments.
She said that defendant Sam
Wardlow's actions were more suspicious
than the conduct of the defendants in two
cases where such searches were upheld:
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868
(1968); and People v. McGowan, 69 Ill.2d 73,
370 N.E.2d 537 (1977).
Flight from the police is such an
extreme reaction that it "lies outside the
bounds of normal human conduct,"
Calderon said.
"Flight from the police provides the
strongest indication that criminal activity
is afoot," she added, citing the U.S.
Supreme Court's underlying rationale for
finding that the stop and search of the
defendant in Terry was justified.
But Assistant Cook County Public
Defender Eileen T. Pahl said that under
the Terry standard, flight from the police
is insufficient to create a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that a person has
committed, is committing or is about to
commit a crime.
"It is the totality of the circumstances,
and not a per se rule," that determines
whether a stop is justified under Terry,
Pahl said.
"Avoidance of the police is entirely
ambiguous," she added, noting that
Wardlow, whose conviction was reversed,
might not have recognized the people he
ran from as police officers because the
record was unclear as to whether their
vehicles were marked.
Chicago police gave chase to Wardlow
after he apparently spotted a squad car
and made a break. The squad car was
among four police vehicles cruising
through a neighborhood where police
were investigating drug-trafficking.
Justice John L. Nickels asked Pahl
whether the fact that the incident
occurred in a high-crime area was not a
significant factor in determining whether
the Terry stop was reasonable.
The defense attorney responded that
under Terry, the person's allegedly
suspicious activity "has to be linked to a
particular crime."
The 1st District Appellate Court had
determined that the evidence did not
support the trial judge's conclusion that
the defendant actually had been in a high-
crime area at the time of the incident, Pah1
noted.
She said the appeals court properly
reversed the Wardlow's conviction on
charges of unlawful use of weapons by a
felon. The 1st District concluded that the
handgun found on Wardlow should have
been excluded from the evidence as the
product of an illegal search.
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The case arose around noon on Sept.
9, 1995, when a caravan of four police
cars were driving through a Chicago
neighborhood where illegal drug activity
had been reported, court records show.
At a hearing on the defendant's
motion to suppress evidence, Officer
Timothy Nolan testified that while he and
his partner were in uniform at the time, he
could not recall whether the other six
officers were in uniform at the time or
whether any of their vehicles were
marked.
According to the appeals court's
opinion, Nolan said he saw defendant,
"who was not violating any laws,"
standing near a building with a white bag
under his arm.
"Defendant looked in the officers'
direction, then fled," the court said, noting
that Nolan stopped the defendant after he
ran through a gangway and an alley.
"Without announcing his office or
asking any questions, [Nolan] conducted a
protective pat-down search of the
defendant," the court said. And that
search yielded a handgun and five live
rounds of ammunition, resulting in the
defendant's conviction and a two-year
pnson sentence.
A unanimous 1st District Appellate
Court, 2d Division, panel reversed
defendant's conviction outright, finding
that the stop and search of the defendant
was improper and that the state could not
prove its case after the seized evidence
was suppressed.
"We emphasize the limited nature of
our holding," Justice Gino L. DiVito
wrote for the appeals court.
"We do not hold that the presence of
a suspect in a high-crime location,
together with his subsequent flight from
police, is never grounds for a Terry stop,"
the opinion continued. "To pass
constitutional muster, however, the high-
crime area should be a sufficiently
localized and identifiable location.
"This limitation is necessary to 'assure
that an individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy is not subject to arbitrary
invasions solely at the unfettered
discretion of officers in the field,' simply
because he or she happens to live in a
neighborhood where crime is prevalent."
People v. Wardlow, 287 IllApp.3d 367, 678
N.E.2d 65 (1997).
Wednesday's oral arguments follow
the high court's acceptance of the state's
petition for leave to appeal under
Supreme Court Rule 315. People v. Sam
Wardlow, No. 83061.
Copyright C 1998 Law Bulletin Publishing
Company
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JUSTICES TO HEAR CASE ON FLIGHT FROM POLICE
Issue Involves Right to Search a Person Who Runs
The Boston Globe
Tuesday, May 4,1999
Richard Carell, Associated Press
WASHINGTON - The Supreme
Court will try to decide whether people
who run away after seeing a police officer
can be chased, stopped and questioned.
The justices agreed yesterday to use a
case from a Chicago high-crime
neighborhood to clarify on-the-street
police powers vs. individual rights.
While many Americans might assume
that police have the power to chase and
question someone who flees at the sight
of them, lower courts have been deeply
divided on the issue. The justices'
decision, expected sometime next year,
could resolve that split.
At the heart of the dispute is the
Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Courts long have interpreted that
protection to mean police without court
warrants cannot stop and question
someone without a "reasonable
suspicion" of wrongdoing.
State courts in Alaska, California,
Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey and Utah have said
police generally cannot make investigative
stops after pursuing someone who flees
after seeing them.
But state courts in Connecticut,
Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, North
Carolina, Ohio and Wisconsin have ruled
that fleeing from police can create a
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct
and thus can justify a police stop.
Federal courts also have disagreed on
the issue.
The Illinois Supreme Court used the
Chicago case to bar police most often
from making such investigative stops.
In appealing that ruling, state
prosecutors said a definitive ruling is
needed. "Every single day, law
enforcement officers at all levels
throughout our country are confronted
with . .. whether to chase and temporarily
stop a person in a high-crime area who
runs away at the mere sight of the police,"
the appeal said.
The nation's highest court twice
before had the opportunity to consider
the issue in criminal cases, but left it
undecided when in 1988 and 1991 it chose
instead to focus on whether police
seizures had occurred.
Sam Wardlow was convicted of a
weapons violation after he was arrested on
a Chicago street in 1995 while carrying a
loaded handgun in a bag.
Police officers in a patrol car had seen
Wardlow spot them and take off running.
They pursued and eventually cornered
him, and found the gun after a patdown
search.
The incident occurred in the 4000
block of West Van Buren Street,
described by state prosecutors as an area
of "high narcotics traffic" at that time.
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Wardlow challenged his conviction for
unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and
the two-year prison sentence it carried. He
said he had been subjected to an unlawful
stop. His appeal in an Illinois court raised
the issue of whether his running away
from police was enough to create a
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop
and patdown search.
A state appeals court threw out his
conviction, and the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld that decision last September
after saying "such flight alone is
insufficient to create a reasonable
suspicion of involvement in criminal
conduct."
Police had acted on "nothing more
than a hunch," the state court said, and in
so doing violated Wardlow's
constitutional rights.
Copyright © 1999 Globe Newspaper
Company
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UNREASONABLE SUSPICION - OF COPS
Will the Supreme Court Rein in Judicial Second-Guessing?
The New York Post
Sunday, May 9,1999
Eric Fettmann
BACK in September 1995, Sam
Wardlow was standing on the street in a
Chicago neighborhood known for its
heavy drug activity when he spotted
uniformed Officer Timothy Nolan driving
by in his patrol car.
Up to that point, Wardlow hadn't
been doing anything unusual or
suspicious. But the moment he spotted
Officer Nolan, he bolted and began
running down the nearest alley. Nolan and
his partner, noticing Wardlow's sudden
flight, gave chase.
When they caught up with Wardlow,
they found a white envelope in his pocket.
Inside was a fully loaded Colt .38 revolver.
Wardlow, who had a lengthy criminal
record, was convicted of unlawful use of a
weapon by a felon and sentenced to two
years. But his conviction was overturned
by the Illinois Supreme Court - which
ruled that "the sudden and unprovoked
flight of a suspect upon seeing police" is
"insufficient to create a reasonable
suspicion of involvement in criminal
activity."
Indeed, said the court, the cops had
acted on "nothing more than a hunch"
when they decided to chase Wardlow
(who, since his conviction was
overturned, has served time on an
unrelated drug charge).
The Illinois decision - which is now
going to be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme
Court - is just as demeaning to law-
enforcement officers as was the similar
1996 ruling by Manhattan Federal Court
Judge Harold Baer that invalidated a
police search of a car from which four
men had fled in Washington Heights.
Like Wardlow, the men were engaged
in criminal activity: The car held 80 kilos
of heroin and cocaine and $1 million in
cash. But Baer ruled that fleeing the police
in Washington Heights should not be
considered suspicious - in fact, he said,
such behavior is entirely reasonable in an
area where "residents ... tend to regard
police as corrupt, abusive and violent."
To date, the Supreme Court has never
spelled out exactly what constitutes
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal
activity. But a certain measure of common
sense should govern.
"Flight from police is such an extreme
reaction that it lies outside the bounds of
normal human conduct," argued Chicago
prosecutor Veronica Ximena Calderon.
"Flight from police provides the strongest
indication that criminal activity is afoot."
To say otherwise - as the Illinois
Supreme Court did - creates an untenable
state of affairs in which police are forced
to "shrug their shoulders and helplessly
stand watching" while people run away
from them.
Nowhere in these rulings is there any
suggestion that training and street
experience provide cops with more than
just a "hunch" about possible criminal
activity. In the wake of the Amadou
Diallo case, however, police are being
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portrayed as a group of gun-toting
vigilantes who have no more ability to
recognize suspicious activity than does the
average bystander.
That, at least, seems to be the
underlying assumption of a bill announced
last week by Reps. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.)
and Jose Serrano (D-Bronx) that would
launch an investigation of the adequacy of
police-training policies.
At least that's what Hyde thought he
was introducing. As Serrano's press
release makes clear, his intent is to
establish a national commission that will
"investigate the apparent pattern of police
violence against people of color in New
York City" and "examine the causes of
police abuse of power" - a situation, he
says, that has "reached crisis proportions."
Serrano, like Wardlow's defenders,
maintains that police don't know what
constitutes suspicious behavior. "Does the
policeman know that if you stop an
Amadou Diallo, for instance, ... that
maybe sticking your hand in your pocket
doesn't necessarily mean you have a
weapon?" asks Serrano. "You could have
a green card to show the police officer."
Indeed he might. But he might also
have a gun and the cop who hesitates
without at least taking the precaution of
protecting himself against that possibility
might find himself on the receiving end of
a hail of bullets.
That leads to widespread
demoralization - which is why, not
surprisingly, arrests here have fallen
sharply since the Diallo shooting. Sure,
cops should do their job correctly but
they should be allowed to do their job.
And a cop whose knowledge and
experience is constantly being second-
guessed by jurists who've never had to
patrol a high-crime neighborhood can't do
his job.
In a famous 1926 opinion delivered
while he was still sitting on the New York
Court of Appeals, the renowned Justice
Benjamin Cardozo lamented the ominous
implications of excluding important
evidence for such reasons: "The criminal
is go free because the constable has
blundered," he wrote.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will
come to the realization that - in the case
of Sam Wardlow and many others like it -
the constables did not blunder.






JamesJ. Kilpatrick, Universal Press Syndicate
These were the circumstances in
Chicago on a September day in 1995,
when police arrested Sam Wardlow:
Police Officer Timothy Nolan was
patrolling a section of the city known for
heavy traffic in narcotics. His patrol car
was one of four police cars that converged
for a full-court press in the 4000 block of
West Van Buren. Nolan was wearing his
full police uniform.
Sam Wardlow was standing in front of
No. 4035. He looked at Nolan and fled.
Nolan followed in hot pursuit. Wardlow
ran at top speed down an alley. After a
brief chase, Nolan and his partner
cornered their target on West Congress
Street.
Nine years of experience as an officer
had taught Nolan that guns are
commonplace in neighborhoods where
illicit drugs are sold. He therefore
performed what is known at law as a
"Terry stop-and-frisk." He patted down
the suspect and squeezed a bulky white
envelope that Wardlow was carrying.
Nolan was not surprised to find that it
contained a fully loaded Colt .38 revolver.
The rest is quickly told. Wardlow had
a criminal record. Nolan arrested him on a
charge of unlawful use of a weapon by a
felon. Before trial, Wardlow moved to
suppress the evidence. The trial judge
denied the motion. He said that when a
person runs away from a police officer,
"there's reasons to think there's a
problem. They have a right to make
inquiry."
Wardlow was found guilty as charged
and sentenced to two years in prison, but
the appellate court reversed. The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed that opinion:
"The weapon that was the basis for
defendant's conviction should have been
suppressed as the product of the
unconstitutional seizure of his person."
Illinois has filed a petition for review
by the Supreme Court. I think it likely that
the Supremes will take the case, for lower
state and federal courts are sharply divided
on the key question: Are police in a high-
crime area justified in stopping and
searching a person who breaks and runs at
the mere sight of an officer?
The high court took a stab at
answering a closely related question
almost 31 years ago in an Ohio case
involving one John W. Terry. He and
another man, Richard Chilton, were
arrested by Cleveland detective Martin
McFadden in 1963. At the time,
McFadden had 39 years of experience as a
police officer. When he saw Terry and
Chilton walking nervously back and forth
in front of a store on Huron Road, he
suspected that an armed robbery was
about to occur. The officer identified
himself and asked for the suspects' names.
When they mumbled, McFadden spun
Terry around and frisked him. Both Terry
and Chilton were carrying revolvers.
Following their convictions for
carrying concealed weapons, Terry
appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction. The stop-and-frisk was
"the tempered act of a policemen who in
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the course of an investigation had to make
a quick decision as to how to protect
himself and others from possible danger,
and took limited steps to do so."
Chief Justice Earl Warren, speaking
for an 8-1 court, refused to lay down
bright lines--either that all such searches
are presumptively reasonable or
presumptively unreasonable. Every case
would depend upon the facts. This is the
language that has divided lower courts for
30 years:
"We merely hold today that where a
police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own and others' safety, he is
entitled ... to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault
him."
With its opinion in the Sam Wardlow
case, Illinois has put the state's police
officers in a lose-lose position. If police
stop a fleeing suspect and find weapons or
contraband, the evidence will be
suppressed. If they do not stop and frisk,
armed criminals will saunter away. In this
instance, I would come down on the side
of the cops. Reasonable suspicion is good
enough for me.




Setting Standards for Condemned Pisoners to Challenge the Death
Penalty
Matthew Frey *
A Virginia case before the Supreme Court this term will shed light on the conditions
under which a state prison inmate may seek to have his conviction reversed in federal court
under provisions contained in a recent federal anti-crime bill. The result may have
widespread influence on the appeals process in death penalty cases nationwide.
The case centers on the plight of Terry Williams, an ex-con who, while imprisoned for
another crime, confessed to the 1985 killing of Harris Thomas Stone, an elderly Danville
resident. Convicted of capital murder in state court, Williams embarked on a protracted
appeals process. Among other claims, Williams alleged that his lawyer at trial failed to
introduce evidence that would have mitigated his death sentence.
Twice rebuffed by the Virginia Supreme Court, Williams, in 1997, filed a federal habeas
corpus petition under provisions of the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, which Congress passed in part to limit death penalty appeals. Williams
contended that his sentence failed to follow established federal law.
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled against
Williams. The court found that the factors that Williams claimed would have mitigated his
sentence had they been introduced at trial did not contain a "reasonable probability" of
having persuaded the jurors who convicted Williams to have chosen life imprisonment over
the death penalty.
Writing for the court, Judge Karen J. Williams emphasized that Williams likely stood to
gain no mercy from a jury well acquainted with his past. She recounted Williams's long and
violent criminal history, including his attack on an elderly woman whom Williams robbed
and left for dead shortly after he murdered Stone. Referring to Supreme Court precedent,
Judge Williams wrote that "Given the overwhelming aggravating factors [in Williams's case],
there is no reasonable probability that the [mitigating evidence] would have ... changed the
sentence imposed." Turning the convict's own argument against him, Judge Williams noted
that the "disclosure of the defendant's juvenile history might even have been harmful to his
case.
Out of the welter of issues Williams has raised throughout his lengthy appeals process,
the Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether Williams was right to bring an appeal under
the Antiterrorism Act and whether, were his trial lawyer in fact deemed ineffective, Williams
would have to show that all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment over the
death penalty.
Two daughters of Harris Stone, the man Williams was convicted of killing, oppose his
execution.
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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Ruling below (4 Cir., 163 F.3d 860):
Even assuming that habeas corpus petitioner's trials counsel were objectively unreasonable
in failing to investigate, prepare, and present certain evidence in mitigation of punishment
during sentencing phase of trial within meaning of test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), for reviewing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, state supreme court reasonably applied clearly established
federal law when it determined, in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner's future
dangerousness to society, that petitioner had not been prejudiced by such failure, and thus
properly denied petitioner's state petition for habeas corpus following imposition of death
sentence: that one hypothetical juror might be swayed by particular piece of evidence is
insufficient to establish prejudice.
Questions presented: (1) When both federal district judge and state trial judge who had
originally sentenced petitioner to death concluded that counsel's deficient performance was
prejudicial under test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, did Fourth Circuit err in denying
relief by reformulating Strickland test so that: (a) ineffective assistance of counsel claims may
be assessed under "windfall" analysis articulated in Lockhart v. Fretwell, even when trial
counsel's error was no "windfall," and (b) petitioner must show that absent counsel's
deficient performance in penalty phase, all 12 jurors would have voted for life imprisonment,
even when state law would have mandated life sentence if only one juror had voted for life
imprisonment? (2) Did Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
state habeas court's decision to deny federal constitutional claim cannot be "contrary to"
clearly established federal law unless it is in "square conflict" with decision of this court that
is "controlling as to law and fact"? (3) Did Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), state habeas court's decision to deny federal constitutional claim cannot
involve "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law unless state court's
decision is predicated on interpretation or application of relevant precedent that "reasonable
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
Decided December 18, 1998
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
On September 30, 1986, a Virginia
jury convicted Terry Williams of the
capital murder of Harris Thomas Stone.
Following the jury's determination that
Williams presented a future danger to
society, the trial court sentenced Williams
to death. After exhausting all available
state remedies, Williams petitioned the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia for habeas
corpus relief. * * * The district court
ordered that the writ be granted on the
ground that Williams's trial counsel were
ineffective because they failed to present
certain evidence in mitigation of
punishment during the sentencing phase
of Williams's trial. The remaining
allegations in Williams's habeas petition
were dismissed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth
contends that the writ was erroneously
granted. We agree. The Virginia Supreme
Court's conclusion that Williams's trial
counsel were not ineffective during the
sentencing phase of Williams's trial was
not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Supreme
Court precedent. As a result, Williams is
not entitled to habeas relief under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA). * * * Moreover,
we conclude that none of the claims raised
in Williams's cross-appeal provide a basis
for federal habeas relief. Accordingly, we
affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
As recited by the Virginia Supreme
Court, the undisputed facts are as follows:
Stone, an elderly man who resided
on Henry Street in Danville, was
found dead in his bed shortly before
2:00 a.m. Sunday, November 3,
1985. There was no sign of a
struggle, no blood was observed on
Stone's body, and he was fully
clothed. Despite a diligent search,
Stone's wallet, which he customarily
kept fastened in the back pocket of
his pants, was never found.
The local medical examiner, who
examined the body [at] about 9:30
that Sunday morning, noted an
abrasion on the chest, but no
bruising. Stone's history of heart
disease and the police failure to
report anything suspicious about the
circumstances of Stone's death led
the local medical examiner to
conclude that Stone's death was due
to heart failure. However, when
Stone's blood alcohol content was
later analyzed and was reported to
be 0.41%, the regional medical
examiner's office in Roanoke
amended the finding of the cause of
death to alcohol poisoning. Stone's
daughter testified Stone looked "a
little high" when she last saw him
entering his house shortly after 6:00
p.m. on Saturday, November 2,
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1985.
When the funeral director, Jack
Miller, observed Stone's body on
Monday morning, he called a bruise
or abrasion over the left ribs to the
attention of the police. The police
told Miller that the local medical
examiner believed the bruise was an
old one. Though Miller disagreed
with the local medical examiner, on
instructions from the police he
embalmed the body.
Almost six months later, the chief of
police in Danville received an
anonymous letter from an inmate of
the local jail in which the author
admitted killing "that man Who Die
on Henry St." The police
interviewed Williams, an inmate of
the Danville jail at the time, who
eventually admitted that he had
written the letter and later gave
multiple confessions to the murder
and robbery of Stone. Williams said
he had first struck Stone in the
chest, and later on his back, with a
mattock and had removed three
dollars from Stone's wallet.
Stone's body was exhumed. On July
2, 1986 Dr. David Oxley, a forensic
pathologist and Deputy-Chief
Medical Examiner for Western
Virginia, performed an autopsy.
When Dr. Oxley opened the body,
he found Stone's fourth and fifth
ribs on the left side had been
fractured and displaced inward,
puncturing the left lung and
depositing a quantity of blood in the
left chest cavity. * * *
After a jury trial in the Circuit Court
of the City of Danville, Virginia, Williams
was convicted of the capital murder of
Mr. Stone. Based on its finding of future
dangerousness * * * the jury
recommended that Williams be sentenced
to death. Following the jury's
recommendation, the trial court sentenced
Williams to death. On direct appeal, the
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed
Williams's conviction and death sentence.
* * * The United States Supreme Court
denied Williams's petition for a writ of
certiorari. * * *
Williams filed a habeas corpus petition
in the Danville Circuit Court on August
26, 1988. After a hearing, the Danville
Circuit Court dismissed the majority of
Williams's claims. Almost seven years
later, Williams amended his habeas
petition to include several claims that his
trial counsel were ineffective. In June
1995, the Danville Circuit Court held an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Prior to any action on the hearing,
however, jurisdiction over the habeas
petition was transferred to the Virginia
Supreme Court. * * * By order dated
May 6, 1996, the Virginia Supreme Court
directed the Danville Circuit Court to
report its findings of fact and conclusions
of law relating to the ineffective assistance
of counsel claims addressed at the June
1995 evidentiary hearing. * * *
On August 15, 1996, the Danville
Circuit Court forwarded its Findings of
Fact and Recommended Conclusions of
Law (the Report) to the Virginia Supreme
Court. The Danville Circuit Court found
that trial counsel's "performance at the
guilt phase of the trial was both
professional and competent." *** Of
particular importance here, the Danville
Circuit Court concluded that trial counsel
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properly handled the court-appointed
mental health experts, and that lead trial
counsel, E.L. Motley, was not suffering
from a mental impairment during the
course of his representation of Williams.
The Danville Circuit Court did
conclude, however, that trial counsel's
failure to present certain mitigating
evidence during the sentencing phase of
the trial warranted relief. Specifically, the
Danville Circuit Court found that trial
counsel failed to investigate and present
(1) Williams's juvenile commitment
records from the Beaumont Correctional
Center, (2) records, including statements
from Williams's siblings, that provided a
summary of Williams's early home life, (3)
the testimony of Williams's estranged wife
and eleven- year-old daughter, and (4) the
testimony of Williams's friend Bruce
Elliot. According to the Report, had this
evidence been developed and presented at
the sentencing phase of Williams's trial,
the jury would have learned that Williams
"had a deprived and abused upbringing;
that he may have been a neglected and
mistreated child; that he came from an
alcoholic family; and that he was
borderline mentally retarded." * * *
Continuing, the Report stated that the
evidence in question would have shown
that Williams's "conduct had been good in
certain structured settings in his life (such
as when he was incarcerated) and ... that
he had redeeming qualities." * * * In
summary, the Danville Circuit Court
found that the mitigating evidence
probably would have been given weight
by at least one member of the jury.
Because one juror would have been the
difference between life and death, the
Report ultimately concluded that Williams
was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to
make use of the mitigating evidence.
Both the Commonwealth and
Williams filed objections to the Report.
The Commonwealth argued that trial
counsel were not ineffective during the
sentencing phase of Williams's trial for
making a tactical decision not to introduce
evidence that was just as likely to operate
to Williams's disadvantage. Williams, in
contrast, argued that the Danville Circuit
Court erred in finding that his trial
counsel were effective during the guilt
phase of his trial. On January 13, 1997,
the Virginia Supreme Court ordered
briefing and argument on the one issue
that the Danville Circuit Court found
warranted relief, and adopted the Danville
Circuit Court's recommendation that the
other claims be dismissed.
On June 6, 1997, the Virginia
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the
Danville Circuit Court's finding that trial
counsel's failure to present certain
mitigating evidence during the sentencing
phase warranted relief. * * * In so
holding, the Virginia Supreme Court
reviewed Williams's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim under Strickland v.
Washington, * * * and, to a lesser extent,
Lockhart v. Fretwell, * * *. After assuming
that Williams's trial counsel's performance
was deficient, the Virginia Supreme Court
concluded that Williams failed to
demonstrate prejudice.
On December 12, 1997, Williams filed
a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254 in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. In his petition Williams argued,
among other things, that his counsel were
ineffective in several respects. On April 7,
1998, the district court ordered that the
writ be granted on the ground that
Williams's trial counsel were ineffective
for failing to present evidence in
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mitigation of punishment during the
sentencing phase of Williams's trial. In so
ruling, the district court specifically
concluded that the Virginia Supreme
Court's application of Strickland and
Lockhart was unreasonable. The
remaining allegations in Williams's habeas
petition were dismissed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth
contends that the district court erred in
granting Williams federal habeas relief. In
particular, the Commonwealth argues that
the Virginia Supreme Court's conclusion
that Williams's trial counsel were not
ineffective was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, clearly
established Supreme Court precedent. In
his cross-appeal, Williams contends: (1)
that his lead trial counsel's mental illness
rendered his assistance constitutionally
ineffective, and (2) that his trial counsel's
failure to handle properly several matters
related to his court-appointed mental
health experts rendered their assistance
constitutionally ineffective. We address
the Commonwealth's and Williams's
arguments in turn.
II.
Before we address the merits of either
the Commonwealth's appeal or Williams's
cross-appeal, we must first determine the
applicable standard of review. The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 provides that:
An application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
We recently interpreted subsection (1)
to prohibit the issuance of the writ unless
(a) the state court decision is in "square
conflict" with Supreme Court precedent
that is controlling as to law and fact or (b)
if no such controlling decision exists, "the
state court's resolution of a question of
pure law rests upon an objectively
unreasonable derivation of legal principles
from the relevant [S]upreme [C]ourt
precedents, or if its decision rests upon an
objectively unreasonable application of
established principles to new facts." Green
v. French, * * * "In other words, habeas
relief is authorized only when the state
courts have decided the question by
interpreting or applying the relevant
precedent in a manner that reasonable
jurists would all agree is unreasonable." Id.
Williams contends, however, that we
erroneously construed § 2254 in Green v.
French. * * * Thus, Williams argues that
the standard of review adopted in that
case should not be followed here. This
argument need not detain us long. "It is
well established that a decision of this
Court is binding on other panels unless it
is overruled by a subsequent en banc
opinion of the Court or an intervening
decision of the United States Supreme
Court." * * * Neither the en banc Court
nor the United States Supreme Court has
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overruled (or even called into question)
the standard of review adopted by this
Court in Green v. French. Indeed, since
Green v. French was decided, we have
applied the new standard in Fitzgerald v.
Greene, ***, Wright v. Angelone, ** *, and
Cardwell v. Greene, * * *. As a consequence,
the standard of review enunciated in Green
v. French continues to be the binding law
of this Circuit.
III.
Although the Virginia Supreme Court
unanimously found that Williams's trial
counsel were not ineffective, * * * the
district court concluded that the Virginia
Supreme Court unreasonably applied
Strickland v. Washington, ** *, and Lockhart
v. Fretwell, ** *, in finding no prejudice.
In addition, the district court found that
the Virginia Supreme Court "made an
error of fact in discussing its finding of no
prejudice." *** Finding that Williams's
trial counsel were constitutionally
ineffective for failing to investigate,
prepare, and present certain evidence in
mitigation of punishment during the
sentencing phase of Williams's trial, the
district court ordered that the writ be
granted. * * * In contrast to the district
court, we conclude that the Virginia
Supreme Court's finding of no prejudice
was neither based on an unreasonable
application of the tests set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland
and Lockhart for determining prejudice,
nor based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing held by the Danville Circuit
Court.
A.
In Strickland, the Supreme Court
established a two-part test for reviewing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
* * * First, Williams must demonstrate
that his trial counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of
reasonableness. *** This, however, is
no simple task. A court's review of
counsel's performance is "highly
deferential." * * * Indeed, courts must
afford a strong presumption that counsel's
performance was within the wide range of
professionally competent assistance. See
id. If Williams is able to demonstrate that
his trial counsel's performances were
objectively unreasonable, he must then
''show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." *
* * As a result, Williams's trial counsel
may be deemed ineffective only if their
"conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result." ** *
In Lockhart, the Supreme Court
clarified the meaning of prejudice under
Strickland. * * * Although the Supreme
Court in Strickland focused primarily on
whether "the result of the proceeding
would have been different," * * *, the
Supreme Court in Lockhart clarified that
"an analysis focusing solely on mere
outcome determination . . . is defective," *
* *. Instead, a proper prejudice analysis
must consider "whether the result of the
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or
unreliable." * * * As a result, a court may
not "set aside a conviction or sentence
solely because the outcome would have
been different but for counsel's error." *
**
The Virginia Supreme Court assumed,
without deciding, that Williams's trial
counsel's performance fell below an
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objective standard of reasonableness. ***
The district court, however, concluded
that Williams's trial counsel were, in fact,
deficient. Like the Virginia Supreme
Court, we will assume, without deciding,
that Williams's trial counsel were
objectively unreasonable in failing to
investigate, prepare, and present certain
evidence in mitigation of punishment
during the sentencing phase of Williams's
trial. Despite assuming that Williams's
trial counsel were objectively unreasonable
in failing to introduce the evidence in
question, we cannot say that the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision that Williams
was not prejudiced thereby was an
unreasonable application of the tests
developed in either Strickland or Lockhart
for determining prejudice. ***
We shall demonstrate that the criminal
proceeding sentencing defendant to death
was not fundamentally unfair or
unreliable, and that the prisoner's
assertions about the potential effects of
the omitted proof do not establish a
"reasonable probability" that the result of
the proceeding would have been different,
nor any probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.
Therefore, any ineffective assistance of
counsel did not result in actual prejudice
to the accused. The jury was presented
with the murder of an intoxicated, elderly
person in his own bedroom committed by
a 31-year-old man. The murder weapon
was a tool customarily used to dig stumps.
At the time, defendant had been out of
the penitentiary for only seven months,
released on parole for convictions of
burglary and grand larceny.
The accused was in the midst of a
crime spree, preying upon defenseless
individuals. Following commission of
these cimes of murder and robbery in
November 1985, the defendant savagely
beat an elderly woman about her head in
March 1986, leaving her lying in the street
unconscious with multiple injuries. At the
time of trial, she was in a nursing home
"vegetating" from a brain injury with no
hope of recovery.
Upon being questioned in April and
May 1986 about the November 1985
crimes, the defendant admitted to the
recent theft of two motor vehicles. He
also admitted setting fire to clothes on the
porch of a residence late one night in
December 1985, luring the occupant
outside, and stabbing him with a knife in
order to rob him. The accused later was
convicted of the vehicle thefts and, at the
time of trial for the present crimes, had
been convicted of an arson that took place
in the city jail.
While held in jail on the present
offenses, he related to a police officer
"that he wanted to just choke some of the
guys in the jail cell, and one day some had
gone to the library and one guy was laying
on the bed, and he got the urge to just go
over and choke him. Another time he
was playing cards and he thought he could
just hit someone and break that person's
jaw without him ever knowing what hit
him."
The jury also heard that defendant had
served time in the penitentiary for an
armed robbery committed when he was
about 20 years old. The jury did not know
of 14 criminal offenses committed by
defendant from 1966 to 1975.
Drawing on Strickland, we hold that,
even assuming the challenged conduct of
counsel was unreasonable, the prisoner
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"suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant
setting aside his death sentence," *** the
predicate of which was that there is a
probability that he would commit criminal
acts of violence which would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society. The
mitigation evidence that the prisoner says,
in retrospect, his trial counsel should have
discovered and offered barely would have
altered the profile of this defendant that
was presented to the jury. At most, this
evidence would have shown that
numerous people, mostly relatives,
thought that defendant was nonviolent
and could cope very well in a structured
environment. Of course, those
assumptions are belied by the four-month
crime spree beginning with the present
crimes and by the defendant's current
attitude while in jail toward other inmates.
What the Supreme Court said in
Strickland applies with full force here:
"Given the overwhelming
aggravating factors, there is no
reasonable probability that the
omitted evidence would have
changed the conclusion that the
aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating
circumstances and, hence, the
sentence imposed." * * *
Indeed, disclosure of the defendant's
juvenile history might even have been
harmful to his case. ***
IV.
In his cross-appeal, Williams contends
that his trial counsel were ineffective in
several respects. First, Williams argues
that his lead trial counsel was mentally ill.
Second, Williams argues that his trial
counsel mishandled several matters related
to his court-appointed mental health
experts. We address these arguments in
turn.
A.
Almost one year after Williams's trial,
his lead trial counsel, E.L. Motley, Jr., was
diagnosed with depression. Soon
thereafter, Motley's depression rendered
him incapable of practicing law. In fact,
after a series of complaints to the Virginia
Bar, Motley was forced to surrender his
license. In his habeas petition, Williams
contends that his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel was
violated because Motley was mentally
impaired during his trial.
It is well established that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel "cannot be
satisfied by mere formal appointment." *
* * Rather, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal defendants the
assistance of "a reasonably competent
attorney." * * * As a consequence, an
attorney's mental incapacity may violate
his client's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Here, however, the Danville
Circuit Court specifically found, after a
two-day evidentiary hearing, that Motley
was not acting under a mental or
emotional disability during Williams's trial:
Petitioner alleges that he was denied
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
because E.L. Motley, Jr.[,] was mentally
impaired and unable to effectively
represent him in the preparation, trial and
appeal of his complex, capital murder
case. This court has heard evidence
relating to this claim, but finds that Motley
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was not acting under a mental or
emotional disability during the course of
his representation of Williams.
Specifically Motley did not begin to have
problems related to his depression until
the late spring or early summer of 1987.
Williams' case was tried in 1986. His brief
on direct appeal was filed in March, 1987.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of
Virginia was issued in September, 1987.
It is clear that what problems Motley
did have thereafter did not manifest
themselves during the trial of this case.
Motley prioritized his work by placing the
criminal matters ahead of civil matters,
and capital murder cases receiving the
highest priority. Both Motley and
Smitherman prepared the appellate brief,
after being counsel in the trial of these
cases.
During the two years that he knew
Motley, Smitherman never noticed
anything about Motley during the course
of Williams' trial. Smitherman did not
begin to notice a difference in Motley's
behavior until 1988. Smitherman noticed
no sign of any dysfunction in Motley
during the time of their joint
representation of Williams.
Based on the testimony at the
evidentiary hearing, and on the personal
observations of this Court during the
course of the criminal trial, this Court
finds that E.L. Motley was acting under
no disability during the course of his
representation of the petitioner.
Furthermore, to the extent that any claim
presented by the petitioner herein is based
on the mental problems suffered by Mr.
Motley, such claims lack merit.
In fact, at no time during the trial did
Motley exhibit any conduct which would
lead one to believe he was suffering from
any disability. The Virginia Supreme
Court adopted the Danville Circuit
Court's finding and dismissed Williams's
Sixth Amendment claim.
The finding that Motley's legal work
was not adversely affected by his
depression until after the conclusion of
Williams's trial and appeal is entitled to a
presumption of correctness in this federal
habeas corpus proceeding. * * * We
cannot say that the Danville Circuit
Court's findings, which were adopted by
the Virginia Supreme Court, are "an
unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented." * * * As
a result, Williams's claim is without merit
and was properly dismissed by the district
court.
B.
On July 10, 1986, Dr. Centor was
appointed by the trial court to examine
Williams after Williams's counsel
intimated that he "may lack substantial
capacity to understand the proceedings
against him or to assist his attorney in his
own defense." * * * Dr. Ryans,
although not specifically appointed by the
trial court, assisted Dr.Centor in
evaluating Williams at the Central State
Hospital. On August 13, 1986, Dr.
Centor filed a report with the trial court
that dealt solely with Williams's
competency to plead. During the
sentencing phase, Dr. Ryans and Dr.
Centor were called by the Commonwealth
as witnesses. Both doctors testified, based
solely on Williams's criminal history, that
Williams represented a future danger to
society.
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In his habeas petition Williams
contends that his trial counsel mishandled
several matters related to Dr. Ryans and
Dr. Centor, the court- appointed mental
health experts. Specifically, Williams
asserts that trial counsel: (1) failed to
object to the dual appointment of mental
health experts, (2) failed to use the
court-appointed experts in violation of
Ake v. Oklahoma, * * *, (3) failed to bar
the Commonwealth's use of the
court-appointed experts, and (4) failed to
rebut the court-appointed experts'
damaging testimony.
1.
First, Williams claims that trial counsel
were ineffective because they failed to
object to the dual appointment of mental
health experts. In response, the
Commonwealth argues that the claim is
procedurally defaulted because it was
never presented to the Virginia state
courts, and, in the alternative, is without
merit. We agree with the Commonwealth
that this claim was procedurally defaulted.
As a result, we decline to address the
merits.
"In the interest of giving state courts
the first opportunity to consider alleged
constitutional errors occurring in a
defendant's state trial and sentencing," a
state prisoner must "exhaust" all available
state remedies before he can apply for
federal habeas relief. * * * To exhaust
state remedies, a habeas petitioner must
present the substance of his claim to the
state's highest court. * * * A procedural
default occurs when a habeas petitioner
fails to exhaust available state remedies
and "the court to which the petitioner
would be required to present his claims in
order to meet the exhaustion requirement
would now find the claims procedurally
barred."
It is undisputed that Williams failed to
present the substance of this claim to the
Virginia Supreme Court. * * * As a
result, Williams failed to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement. Moreover, if this
claim was presented to the Virginia
Supreme Court for the first time at this
juncture, it would be procedurally barred
pursuant to Va.Code Ann. §
8.01-654(B)(2) (Michie Supp.1998).
Under 5 8.01-654(B)(2), "a petitioner is
barred from raising any claim in a
successive petition if the facts as to that
claim were either known or available to
petitioner at the time of his original
petition." * * * Accordingly, we conclude
that this claim is procedurally defaulted.
We may excuse Williams's procedural
default, however, if he can demonstrate
either cause for and resulting prejudice
from the default,or that he has suffered a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. ***
Because Williams has not established
either, his claim is not cognizable in a
federal habeas petition. * * *
2.
Next, Williams claims that trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to use
the court-appointed experts in violation of
Ake. Like Williams's first claim, this claim
was never raised in state court and,
therefore, is procedurally defaulted.
Because Williams cannot demonstrate
cause for and resulting prejudice from the
default, or that he has suffered a
fundamental miscarriage of justice, this
claim is not properly before us on federal
habeas review * * *.
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Next, Williams asserts that trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to
prevent the Commonwealth from calling
his court-appointed experts as witnesses. *
* * In particular, Williams contends that
his trial counsel should have objected
when Dr. Ryans and Dr. Centor testified
that he was a future danger to society. As
the district court noted, however, Virginia
law does not necessarily bar testimony
from court-appointed experts. Indeed,
the testimony is admissible so long as the
expert does not use "statements or
disclosure" made to him by the defendant
as part of the basis for forming his
opinion on future dangerousness. * **
Because the experts' testimony was not
based on any statements Williams made
but rested solely on Williams's criminal
record, any objection would have been
futile. As such, trial counsel's
performance was simply not deficient.
Accordingly, the Virginia Supreme Court's
rejection of the claim cannot be deemed
an unreasonable application of Strickland.
Finally, Williams argues that trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to
rebut the damaging testimony of his
court-appointed experts. In essence,
Williams is upset that trial counsel were
unable to find an expert who supported
his theory of the case. This Court has
made clear, however, that a criminal
defendant does not have a right to
favorable expert testimony. * * * Thus,
that trial counsel were unable to rebut the
damaging testimony of his courtappointed
experts does not render their assistance
ineffective.
V.
Because Williams has failed to provide
any grounds upon which habeas relief may
be granted, the decision of the district
court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part.
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The U.S. Supreme Court announced
yesterday that it would take up the appeal
of condemned Virginia killer Terry
Williams, who has been on death row for
13 years and was slated to be executed
today.
On Friday, the justices issued an order
postponing Williams's execution. Now
that they have agreed to hear his argument
that he was denied adequate legal help at
his sentencing, it's likely that Williams's
case will not be resolved until sometime
next year.
An eventual ruling in the dispute,
which also will address a provision of a
1996 federal law intended to curtail the
appeals process in death penalty cases, will
affect condemned inmates nationwide.
Williams was convicted and sentenced
to die for the 1985 slaying of an elderly
Danville man, Harris Thomas Stone, who
was found in his bed. The death originally
was not considered a homicide, and the
medical examiner, finding that Stone's
blood-alcohol content was at 0.41 percent,
determined that he died of alcohol
poisoning. About six months later,
however, Williams confessed that he had
struck Stone with a gardening tool known
as a mattock and taken his wallet
containing $3.
Williams was found guilty in 1986 of
capital murder and robbery. He contended
in his petition to the high court that his
lead trial lawyer, who himself was in the
throes of a disciplinary hearing during the
trial, failed to begin preparing for the
sentencing phase until about a week
beforehand and presented "virtually
nothing" to the jury that would have
influenced it to give Williams life in prison
rather than death.
In its order agreeing to hear the case
of Williams v. Taylor yesterday, the
Supreme Court said it would focus on
standards for permitting a prisoner to
challenge a death sentence -- and on
whether Williams must demonstrate that
if he hadn't had such a bad lawyer, all 12
jurors would have voted for life in prison
rather than the death penalty.
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected Williams's contention that he
should be resentenced, using a particularly
stiff standard of review and ruling that any
errors his lawyer made during the 1986
sentencing did not unconstitutionally
prejudice the jury.
"We are pleased that the Supreme
Court has recognized that there are
important legal issues at stake in this
case," said Brian A. Powers, the
Washington attorney representing
Williams on appeal.
Two daughters of the victim are
among those who oppose Williams's
being put to death.
Pollie Cosby, 44, of Chatham, Va.,
said yesterday that Williams deserves
leniency -- life in prison without the
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possibility of parole -- because "if he
hadn't confessed, no one would have
known" that her father had been
murdered.
"That's the main reason," said Cosby,
who added that otherwise she is not
opposed to the death penalty.
She said her sister, Janidean Stones,
37, of Gretna, Va., also opposes the
execution and, unlike her, opposes all
death sentences as a matter of principle.
Meanwhile, a group of religious and
civil rights organizations is planning a
protest in Charlottesville today against the
four other executions still scheduled this
month in Virginia.
The coalition - which includes the
Charlottesville Friends Meeting, Amnesty
International, the American Civil Liberties
Union of Virginia, Virginians for
Alternatives to the Death Penalty and the
Charlottesville Center for Peace and
Justice - plans a protest on the date of
each of the scheduled executions.
Copyright C 1999, The Washington Post
Co. All Rights Reserved
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Also This Tern:
98-7540 Carmell v. Texas
Ruling below (Tex. App., 963 S.W.2d 833):
State law that, as amended in 1993, removed prior requirement that minor victim of sex
offense inform third party within six months of alleged offense in order for conviction of
such offense to be "supportable" on uncorroborated testimony of victim, Tex. Code Crim.
P. Art. 38.07, is rule of procedure within meaning of precedent on ex post facto clause, Hopt
v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), and was thus applicable upon its adoption to pending and
future prosecutions, including defendant's prosecution based on victim's 1995 disclosure to
her mother of assault alleged to have occurred in 1992.
Question presented: Did Texas Court of Appeals err, in violation of Fifth and 14th
Amendments, by concluding that application of 1993 version of Tex. Code Crim. P. Art.
38.07 was not ex post facto when: (i) offense occurred in 1992, one full year before
adoption of new rule of law; (ii) there was no outcry for approximately three years, and law
in effet at time required outcry within six months; and (iii) petitioner would have otherwise
been entitled to acquittal?
98-7809 Martinez v. California Court of Appeal
Ruling below (Cal. Ct. App., 10/16/98, unpublished):
Defendant's motion to represent himself on appeal is denied.
Question presented: Does criminal defendant have constitutional right to elect self-
representation on direct appeal from judgment of conviction?
98-1255 United States v. Martinez-Salazar
Ruling below (9t Cir., 146 F.3d 653, 63 Crim L. Rep. 290):
Federal defendant who, in exhausting his allotment of peremptory strikes, is forced to use on
against venireperson whom he should have been allowed to strike for cause is entitled to
reversal of his conviction.
Question presented: Is defendant entitled to automatic reversal of his conviction in case in
which he used peremptory challenge to remove potential juror whom district court
erroneously failed to remove for cause, and he ultimately exhausted his remaining
peremptory challenges?
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98-1037 Smith v. Robbins
Ruling below (9 Cir., 152 F.3d 1062, 62 Crim. L. Rep. 1050):
No-merit brief, filed by appointed counsel in state defendant's appeal as of right, that
summarized trial record and offered to brief any issues identified by court but failed to
present any possible grounds for appeal failed to meet minimal standards of Anders v.
Cakfornia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), even though it was adequate under California law; in light of
counsel's failure to either provide vigorous representation or comply fully with Anders by
moving to withdraw and filing adequate no-merit brief, petitioner was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal; facts of petitioner's case
almost directly mirrored those of Anders, and, therefore, grant of relief did not involve
application of "new rule" on collateral review, as prohibited by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989).
Questions presented: (1) Did Ninth Circuit err in finding that California's no-merit brief
procedure, in which appellate counsel who has found no nonfrivolous issues remains
available to brief any issues appellate court might identify, violates Sixth Amendment Anders
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal? (2) Did Ninth Circuit err when it ruled that
asserted Anders violation required new appeal, without testing claimed Sixth Amendment
error under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)? (3) Did Ninth Circuit violate rule
announced in Teague v. Lne, which prohibits retroactive application of new rule on collateral
review, when it invalidated California's well-settled, good-faith interpretation of federal law?
98-1441 Roe v. Ortega
Ruling below (9 Cir., 160 F.3d 534):
Rule of United States v. Stearns, 68 F.3d 328, 58 Crim. L. Rep. 1198 (9t Cir. 1995), that
counsel's failure to file appeal after guilty plea conviction is ineffective assistance within
meaning of Sixth Amendment even if no prejudice is shown, was mere application of circuit
court's prior decision in Loada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956 (91h Cir. 1992), and, therefore, as
applied to habeas corpus petitioner whose trial post-dated Lo.Zada, does not amount to "new
rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which generally bars application of new rules
of constitutional law on federal habeas corpus.
Question presented: Does trial counsel have duty under Sixth Amendment to file notice of
appeal following guilty plea if defendant has not so requested, particularly if defendant has
been advised of his appeal rights?
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98-1299 New York v. Hill
Ruling below (N.Y., 92 N.Y.2d 406, 681 N.Y.S.2d 775, 704 N.E.2d 542):
Defendant, who was incarcerated in another state, did not waive speedy trial rights under
Interstate Agreement on Detainers merely by concurring in trial date outside LAD's speedy
trial provision after that date was proposed by court and accepted by prosection; indictment
must be dismissed as untimely.
Question presented: Does defendant's express agreement to trial date beyond 180-day
period required by IAD constitute waiver of his right to trial within such period?
98-1170 Portuondo v. Agard
Ruling below (2d Cir., 64 Crim. L. Rep. 123, modifying 117 F.3d 696, 61 Crim. L. Rep.
1408):
Although prosecutor is not forbidden by Constitution to make factual argument that
defendant used his familiarity with testimony of prosecution witnesses to tailor his own
testimony, generic argument that defendant's credibility is less than that of prosecution
witnesses solely due to fact that he attended entire trial whereas other witnesses were present
only for their own trial testimony amounts to improper bolstering of prosecution witnesses'
credibility on basis of defendant's exercise of his constitutional right of presence at trial.
Question presented: Did Second Circuit err in extending this court's decision in Gifin v.
Cakfornia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which prohibited prosecutor's comment on defendant's right
to remain silent, to prosecutor's comments on testifying defendant's presence in courtroom
during testimony of other witnesses?
98-6322 Slack v. McDaniel
9h Cir., unpublished
Court denied request for certificate of probable cause to review district court ruling holding
that petitioner's habeas corpus action is "second or successive petition" as to most of
grounds raised in petition and, therefore, constitutes abuse of writ as to those grounds, and
that petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies on remaining ground.
Question presented: If person's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is
dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and he subsequently exhausts his state
remedies and refiles §2254 petition, are claims included within that petition that were not
included with is initial § 2254 filing "second or successive" habeas applications?
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98-942 Fiore v. White
Ruling below (3d Cir., 149 F.3d 221):
Precedents holding that states are under no constitutional obligation to apply their own
decision on criminal law retroactively and that new state law decisions are not applicable
retroactively on federal habeas corpus preclude federal habeas relief for petitioner who
argued that he has due process right to retroactive application of state court decision, on
direct appeal, that reversed conviction of co-defendant convicted of same crime on same
facts; petitioner's claims that 14' Amendment's equal protection clause entitles him to
benefit of decision in co-defendant's case is inconsistent with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), and its progeny, which largely deny benefit of new constitutional rules to defendants
on collateral review and invariably result in differential treatment of defendants who,
although convicted at same time, exhaust their direct appeals at different times.
Questions presented: (1) Did state flout due process clause of 14t Amendment and evade
federal habeas corpus relief for incontestably innocent prisoner by claiming that appellate
decision constituted "new law," when in fact state did not and could not prove key element
of crime at trial? (2) Should federal habeas relief be extended to protect federal constitutional
rights when state refuses to retroactively apply case that based its decision on already existing
clear language of statute?
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